Canister -- On!! ----- Fire!!!!!!
Australian Tank Operations in South Vietnam
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Updated 22/4/08 Chapter 31 |
Bruce asks that anyone who spots anything amiss in the following extracts to please contact him and let him know. He reiterates that the material is from a first draft only and it will undergo considerable revision before being ready for publication.
Foreword
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Preface |
The
Centurions had become an essential part of operations which
involved attacking enemy strongholds---exactly the purpose for
which tanks were first built in 1915! Their withdrawal before
the end to such operations raised questions, not for the first
time, about the balance between military plans and political
priorities. Nevertheless, the 'Cents' and their crews, finished
their service in Vietnam as they had started---helping to carry
the day in the true spirit of Australian armour. A former
crewman interviewed during research for this book reflected the
sense of this spirit perfectly: 'What we as crews, troops,
squadrons and the Regiment as a whole achieved, over time, was
pretty bloody amazing and I am very proud to have been a small
part of that achievement'. This is the story of those crews and
their achievements.
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|
The Australian Armoured Heritage |
On 14 December 1948 the King gave approval for the prefix
'Royal' to be adopted by the Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC).
Six months later, on 7 July 1949, the 1st Armoured Regiment was
officially constituted, albeit only with one squadron at the
time. This was not the first unit of that title in the
Australian Army. In early 1945, the 1st Armoured Regiment was
one of five armoured regiments in the Australian Armoured Corps.
Equipped with Matilda tanks, it earned distinction at Balikpapan
(SWPA) in July 1945. The unit was disbanded three years later,
with 1st Armoured Regiment (Royal New South Wales Lancers)
subsequently becoming one of the CMF units designated to form
part of the post war armoured corps. To avoid confusion with the
newly formed regular army unit, it reverted to its historical
title of 1st RNSWL in 1949.
1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, was
originally equipped with Churchill tanks. These had arrived in
Australia in 1945, too late for the final operations of WWII.
Australia's first order of 35 Centurions started to be delivered
in September 1951. Later orders from England brought Australia's
Centurion fleet to a strength of 127 by 1961.
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| Topic: Puckapunyal | Unfortunately nothing could be done about the weather in Victoria and it was hard during mid-winter on Puckapunyal range, one of the coldest places imaginable, for nayone to convince themselves that they were training for war in the tropics. One of the lessons from armoured operations in the SWPA during WWII was that 'prior training to condition crews [to the extreme heat and lack of ventilation to be found within tanks] is essential'. With the unit manning as it was, however, this was just impossible. Members of the Squadron who might be training in thick padded tank 'oversuits', gloves and scarves one day, could find themselves flying out to Vietnam as immediate replacements the next. Especially in the case of crew commanders, they could well be expected to commence operational duties virtually as soon as they arrived. The Puckapunyal weather could not be allowed to detract from the training objectives, however; and, in the main, it did not. |
| National Service |
Expansion of the Army to the extent required to meet the deteriorating strategic situation could not be achieved by recruiting alone, yet the circumstances did not meet the criteria for the call out of the CMF. This could only happen if the Government declared a 'Defence Emergency'. Having risen to the position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, following his command of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam in 1967, Major General 'Stewie' Graham, OBE, MC, considered it a great pity that the CMF were not called out. In his view, 'this was one of the bad aspects of this insidious type of war [i.e. undeclared]---no Government wants to be able to present other than a "business as usual" approach and it's hard to win wars that way'. |
|
Armoured Centre and Canungra |
The role of a
Corps School can easily be overlooked in terms of its contribution
to operational success. Given the constraint on training time
imposed by National Service, the scheduling of AFV crew courses was
particularly important during the Vietnam War. To help achieve the
best outcome, the Directorate of Armour would advise Armoured Centre
as early as possible of their forecasts for the numbers and
qualifications of replacements required for service in Vietnam. This
would enable Armoured Centre to schedule the appropriate courses and
be assured of producing the right numbers of crewmen with the right
skills. Of utmost importance, however, was the need to ensure that
standards did not suffer.
There
was no doubt that, from a physical viewpoint, Canungra was very
demanding. This enabled confidence to be drawn from having been
pushed hard. In the opinion of Trooper Ian Hunter who was to
serve as a gunner with B Squadron in 1969, 'although it was
tough, it was useful in the sense that you got to know how far
you could go'. Apart from fitness and individual weapon
handling, however, many felt that the potential of the training
was being wasted as far as Armoured Corps personnel were
concerned. Unfortunately, the BE course became not only
politically mandatory, but also totally inflexible in terms of
the way it was run.
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|
Background to the War |
The Viet Minh became expert in laying ambushes to capitalise on the predicability of French tactics. The success of these was made graphically known to the world in 1961 with the publication of Bernard Fall's book, Street Without Joy. With hardly any other up to date information available, this book became 'required' reading for Australian Army officers. As a result, force structure decisions were based on lessons drawn from its pages. Some of these were subsequently found to be relevant only to the particular circumstances and equipment involved. In one part, for example, Fall vividly described a series of ambushes which almost completely annihilated Groupement Mobile (GM) 100, supposedly a highly mobile and powerful task force with integral artillery and tank support. Scenes similar to the accounts of Japanese tactics in the SWPA were described: 'extremely dense and accurate fire on the slits of the following tanks also wounded some of their crews and the Viet infantry began to climb onto the vehicles'. Rather than destroying them with anti-tank weapons, apparently the Viet Minh tried to storm tanks with infantry in the hope of capturing them intact. |
|
Ambrose Squadron |
Australia's plan for such a contingency had been in place for some time (originally named Plan AMBROSE) and B Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment formed part of the Order of Battle for the Australian response force. A Squadron 4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse (4/19 PWLH) and A Squadron 2nd/14th Queensland Mounted Infantry (2/14 QMI), both regular army components of CMF units at the time, provided the reconnaissance and anti-tank elements of Ambrose Force. |
|
The Light Tank Debate |
The fact that it was possible for the Order of Battle for Plan HAMMERHEAD to comprise a balanced force incorporating its own close fire support, was due to the efforts of a number of dedicated RAAC officers. Indeed, but for them, 1st Armoured Regiment may not have been able to maintain the capability and skills which were to prove so valuable in Vietnam. When Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Eldridge took over as Director, RAAC, in November 1956, there was a major fight raging at AHQ with respect to the role of tanks in the Australian Army. The concern centred on the view that the Centurion was too heavy to be used in South East Asia, a light tank was needed. Provided it had a reasonable gun, a lightly armoured vehicle was all that was required for infantry support anyway, or so it was argued. After all, a 'heavy' tank was only required to defeat other tanks. The matter got to the point of being debated in Parliament and reported in the the press. |
|
Australia Commits Troops |
Despite
earlier optimism, by 1965 it had become evident that the ARVN,
even with the support of limited American strategic bombing,
could not hold off the VC and NVA by themselves. Around mid May
the capital of Phuoc Long Province was captured. 'One thousand
South Vietnamese rangers with their 40 US advisers were routed'
by the VC. Not long after, Quang Ngai City fell, together with
the capitals of Darlac, Pleiku and Phu Bon Provinces. ARVN
forces suffered heavy losses, with whole battalions being wiped
out. President Johnson committed US combat units to stem the
tide. Following the formality of an official request from the
South Vietnamese Government, Prime Minister Menzies announced
that a 1RAR group, including a troop of APCs, would be sent to
form part of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade---the first US ground
force unit to be deployed.
Interestingly, the US Marine Corps did not subscribe to
their Army's view. When ordered to bolster the security of
the Da Nang airbase in March 1965, the landing teams went
ashore with their integral tank support. The US Ambassador
was subsequently displeased to learn that the Marines had
landed with equipment which was considered inappropriate for
counter insurgency operations. Not surprisingly, during
discussions later that year on the deployment to Vietnam of
armoured units from other nations, a Korean proposal to send
a tank battalion was disapproved on the grounds that 'the
area was inappropriate for tanks'. Such US opposition may
account for some of the secrecy that was later to surround
Australian planning to provide its own tank support.
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| Topic: Nui Dat |
Nui Dat
was chosen as the site for the Task Force because of its
location close to the centre of Phuoc Tuy Province, the area
within which 1ATF was to conduct operations. The Task Force
was thought to be more capable of dominating the Province
from there, than would have been the case if it had been
based in Vung Tau or Baria, the other proposed locations.
Those who argue that Vung Tau would have been a better
location, claim that it would have relieved the Task Force
of the burden of securing the large Nui Dat base area. At
the time it was established in 1966, the Task Force
comprised two battalions, 5RAR and 6RAR.
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| The Need for Tanks | A case can be made for an emphasis on specially trained and equipped, highly mobile infantry, in the first stage of revolutionary warfare when the guerrillas are endeavouring to develop their infrastructure; i.e. a 'no tanks in the jungle' approach. The challenge is to realise when this phase has passed, to be conscious of the options available, and to restructure forces appropriately. In hindsight, the nature of the enemy forces involved in the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966 should have made it clear that the time for the deployment of an enhanced armoured capability, including tanks, had arrived. |
| Operation BRIBIE | The month after Brigadier Graham assumed command, an encounter battle occurred which was to provide overwhelming evidence of the need for tanks. On 17 February 1967, during Operation BRIBIE, 6RAR contacted an enemy force occupying a well prepared defensive position in dense forest. Estimated as at least a reinforced company, they fought aggressively and used their carefully concealed bunkers and firelanes to maximum advantage. |
| Operation RENMARK |
Operation
RENMARK highlighted the vulnerability of APCs to mines.
Coming so soon after their vulnerability to anti-armour
weapons had also been demonstrated, the argument in favour
of tanks was given particular emphasis. It is understandable
that the thought of tanks being relatively immune to mines,
allowing them to 'clear the way for more vulnerable
vehicles', would find its way into a justification for the
deployment of Centurions to Vietnam. The time had not yet
come, when the danger of tanks being thought of as de facto
mineclearers, was evident to all.
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| The Submission is Finalised |
Major General Vincent, supported by the first
Commander 1ATF, Brigadier David Jackson, DSO, OBE, had been
pressing for tanks to be made available in Vietnam for some
time. The latter had come to appreciate the capability of
Centurions when he was acting as Battle Group Commander for
a major exercise, CRUSADER, at Tin Can Bay, Queensland, in
1964. As had been found on other occasions, the training
value gained, more than justified the challenges involved in
moving the tanks away from Puckapunyal. Despite heavy rain
and almost impassable conditions, the tank squadron, under
Major 'Dick' Bird, managed to negotiate the seemingly
impassable terrain in the exercise area. The then Colonel
Jackson was impressed: 'I badly needed tanks [for a planned
attack] and there they were. I would never have believed it
possible. It was then that I realised that conditions in
Vietnam would never stop tanks'.
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| Centurions are Finally Approved | Although 1st Armoured Regiment was not made aware of the pending decision to send tanks to Vietnam, Major General Vincent and his staff in Saigon were. On 23 August 1967, COMAFV advised Major D R Kepper, an Armoured Corps officer on his staff, that a 'tank squadron was 90% certain'. On 5 September, he informed the Task Force Commander that the tank deployment was to be considered in Canberra very shortly---immediately following the CGS Exercise. Just over a week later Brigadier Hughes was instructed that logistic systems must be established and functioning before the tanks arrive. Contingency plans were to be made regarding accommodation, workshops, ammunition storage, spares scaling and personnel increases. The political processes were still in effect, however. On 28 September 1967, the Deputy CGS advised COMAFV that the 'decision was not yet made, nor any indication as to what it will be or when. However, preliminary planning [is being] undertaken here as precautionary measure. Matter very sensitive and discussions should be on a strictly need to know basis'. |
| The Rush to Get Ready |
Lieutenant Gerry McCormack was a
tank troop leader participating in an exercise on
Puckapunyal range when the PM's announcement was made. The
exercise was cancelled and those involved were ordered to
return immediately to Kapyong Barracks. It is fair to say
that there was some excitement in the air as tanks, APCs and
Ferret scout cars headed back at best speed across
Puckapunyal Range! On arrival it was learnt that the news
was confirmed and that arrangements to assemble the squadron
would commence the following day.
The officers were advised
that the CO and Second-in-Command (2IC) would be
selecting who was to go. It was not widely known at the
time that the CO had had no prior warning himself. He
even had to ring AHQ to confirm the radio broadcast.
Things started to move quickly after that, however.
Major Peter Badman and Captain Alan Vickers were the
first appointments: OC and 2IC respectively.
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| Why the "Absurd Secrecy"? |
There is little doubt that 1st Armoured Regiment was
being kept in the dark. Further evidence is provided by the
fact that in mid 1967, Captain Sullivan learnt that a
squadron's worth of recently rebuilt Centurions,
incorporating the latest modifications, was being held in a
state of 'readiness' at 1COD. He informed Lieutenant Colonel
Wilton, who phoned the Directorate of Armour to ask if this
indicated the likelihood of tanks being sent to Vietnam. The
answer was definite: no such deployment was being planned.
On at least three other occasions AHQ categorically rejected
any suggestion of tank support being provided to 1ATF. 1st
Armoured Regiment, therefore, continued to be 'bled' of its
personnel and to be denied vital preparation time. Indeed,
there was no alternative other than to continue training in
conventional warfare tactics and skills---as might be
required for the defence of continental Australia.
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| Other Sides to the Deployment |
There is no doubt that it must
have been an enormous shock to all those who learnt on 17
October 1967, or soon after, that they were heading to SVN,
virtually immediately! The fact that the Squadron had been
able to ready itself for deployment for active service
within the few months available, with absolutely no warning
beforehand, is a tribute to the leadership, self sacrifice
and co-operation displayed by all ranks within 1st Armoured
Regiment at the time. The enormous support afforded by
families, in what could only have been the most stressful
circumstances imaginable, must be acknowledged also.
The sense of community that developed quickly must have been a great comfort at the time. Not only was there someone to mow the lawn as might be needed, but also there was someone always available to share problems if need be. The final observation belongs to Major Badman: 'I have nothing but praise for the people who worked day and night, seven days a week, to get us away---but [I] will never forget the absurd secrecy which prevented even the CO of the unit being warned in decent time'. |
| Topic: The work involved. | Those coming later did not appreciate how lucky they were to be able to take over a base area which was fully set up and functioning. There was hardly anything established at all when the C Squadron main party arrived at Nui Dat on 12 February 1968. They immediately set about erecting tents, filling sandbags and starting to construct the messes and other important facilities. According to Sergeant Bob Snape, Special Equipment Troop Sergeant at the time, the early days involved 'many hours of hard bloody work laying sandbags, digging weapon pits and building the CP [Command Post]'. The same work had been going on in the Tank Squadron Workshop area for some weeks. |
| Getting Set Up |
On 13 February 1968, the Commander's
War Diary for C Squadron recorded that 'There was so much sweat
lost by the newly arrived, who at this stage were not
acclimatised. The bright red dust, added to the sweat, made most
of the Squadron appear as 'red indians' by the end of the day'.
While there would have been little time for reflection, Trooper
David Weigall noted in a letter home that evening: 'It's hard to
imagine that we are really here, the shooting we hear is for
real and the weapons we carry are loaded'.
Defending the
Squadron's allocated perimeter at Nui Dat was difficult to say
the least: 'We had an enormous area to cover, nearly twice the
size of that allocated to a battalion---whilst you could cover
it by observation and fire during the day, it was a bit hard to
do that at night. As a result, masses of barbed wire, trip
flares and the like had to be put out.'
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| The First Shot is Fired |
Second Lieutenant Owens again
commanded the escort, such as it was. The mission turned out to be
of significance in a historical context. Owens recalls:
As we neared the outskirts of Baria, the Company Commander requested that we engage an area from which sporadic 'pot shots' were being received. This we did, however, as luck would have it, my 'fifty' experienced a stoppage. Fortunately the enemy fire had been suppressed and the remainder of the escort passed without incident. Apart from me, the crews on both vehicles were from the Armoured Squadron Workshops. So it was that 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, fired its first shot in action. |
| Moving the Tanks to Nui Dat |
Ten days
later (24 February), the Jeparit arrived. Skeleton crews,
under the direction of the Squadron Technical Officer, worked
through the night to unload the tanks and stores. Captain Sullivan
recalls:
Although the ship arrived in daylight, there was cargo above the tanks which had to be unloaded before we could get to them. It was dark before we could start and although the sun was down, it was as hot as the 'hobs of hell' in the hold. The tank crews worked inside the vehicles in the hold to clear internal shipping preservation we had fitted in Australia and to connect up the batteries. The ship's crew were concerned about high octane petrol vapour and the sealing tapes over the fuel tank breathers were the last items removed. |
| The Second Move |
Things did not go quite as
smoothly with the delivery of the second consignment of tanks at the
end of August 1968. Eleven vehicles were involved: four each for 3
and 4 Troops; plus three for Forward Delivery Troop. The MV
Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau, only to find that there was no
suitable crane available. The US Army proposed that the ship go to
Saigon and be unloaded there. Warrant Officer Peter Bayliss, Second
Mate aboard the LSM Clive Steele at the time, explains that
the merchant seamen aboard the Jeparit:
...refused, unless they were paid exorbitant danger money. The [Australian] Army would not agree and sent the ship instead to Cam Ranh Bay, a deep water port about 300km to the north. We were taken off our normal duties and went to Cam Ranh to help pick up the tanks and bring them back'. |
| Forward Delivery Troop | Whilst troop leaders and crew commanders were generally posted on a one for one replacement basis, most of the AFV crewmen arriving at Nui Dat, as well the tanks, were first taken on strength of the Detachment, 1 Forward Delivery Troop (or 'Dribbles' Troop, as it was known). Interestingly, in the early 1960s the Troop was raised to support the possible deployment of Ambrose Squadron. It was located at Armoured Centre and was responsible for ensuring that 1 Armoured Regiment had the vehicles and crewmen it needed. Later, after the SEATO contingency passed, Forward Delivery Troop reverted to being part of the War Establishment of Armoured Centre. On mobilisation for war, Armoured Centre would have the role of not only training new tank crewmen, but also splitting off Forward Delivery Troop to hold immediate reinforcements for armoured units. The Detachment raised for Vietnam was authorised as a separate establishment in its own right and this would be the first time since WWII that the system of delivering tanks and crews forward to an operational unit was to be put into practice. Its importance was quickly reaffirmed |
| Topic: Tank design | What if the 'Lambro' had come along? There are some who would argue that it is inappropriate for tanks to be used in such situations. What the scenario demonstrates, of course, is the flexibility inherent in AFVs of all types. Designing a tank is always a matter of striking the right balance between firepower, mobility, and protection. Whatever the relative priorities between the three, such a combination of characteristics, coupled with good communications, meant that even the elderly Centurions were suitable for employment on a wide variety of tasks in SVN. |
| Crew Duties |
'Probably the main frustration of
being a driver, in my experience anyway, was waiting to be told
(and sometimes never being told) what was going on. Sometimes
the first indication that something was happening was the sound
of a round going into the main gun and the almighty bang that
followed'.
'...we gunners are a funny lot, as we only ever saw the damn country through the sight or periscope. We weren't allowed out and had to sit there like dummies while the crewie and loader chatted on the radio' |
| The Centurion Build Standard |
All the Centurions being landed in Vietnam had undergone a
number of changes since they were first designed and built in
the UK. In 1945 the original Mark 1s had been designed to carry
a 17 pounder (76.2mm) gun. Australia's first 60 tanks which
started to arrive in late 1951 were Mark 3 vehicles which
mounted a 20 pounder gun (83.4mm), together with a 7.92mm Besa
coaxial machine gun. This was a Czechoslovakian machine gun
first produced by the Brno factory in 1937 and later
manufactured under licence by the Birmingham Small Arms Factory
(UK). Subsequent Australian orders amounting to 57 tanks and 6
ARVs (Mk 2), were delivered between 1956 and 1958. These tanks
were built to Mark 5 standard prior to shipping.
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| Ammunition Selection | Interestingly, a number of trials involving tanks firing canister were conducted at the Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) School at Puckapunyal around 1943. The aim was to find the best method of neutralising Japanese bunkers. The techniques developed were obviously successful because one of the most frequent inclusions under lessons learnt from WWII operations in the SWPA was that: 'Canister is most effective for clearing jungle and for engagement of personnel and ill-defined targets'. Exactly the same words could be used almost 30 years later to describe the employment of canister rounds in Vietnam. 9RAR, one of the battalions to be supported by the Centurions in 1968--69, concurred: 'The tanks' firepower, particularly their canister, was devastating on anything above ground' |
| RMG Modification | While all tanks issued to C Squadron from 1 Central Ordnance Depot stocks were supposed to have been fully modified, one of the the two dozers to accompany the Squadron lacked both IR and RMG capabilities. In 1963 only one dozer tank was scheduled to be modified and held as part of the tank squadron deployment reserve for Operation HAMMERHEAD. The new establishment suddenly produced for an 'independent' squadron for SVN obviously caught the logistic system by surprise and the vehicle had to be sent as it was. The Army, in fact, only just managed to get one dozer ready in time, with modifications to callsign 92Alpha (ARN 169106) being completed on 5 October 1967. |
| RAEME Support |
When Centurions first arrived in SVN, their repair and
maintenance support was provided by 1 Independent Armoured
Squadron Workshop, a supporting unit raised in conjunction with
the reorganisation of one squadron of 1st Armoured Regiment for
service in SVN. Its OC, Captain Bruce Dittmar, RAEME, recalls
that: 'time was so short that the unit was only able to come
together on parade once before arriving in SVN'. Whilst the
formation of the Workshop and deployment of the Tank Squadron
were announced at the same time on 17 October 1967, the Workshop
had to be up and running at Nui Dat in time to support the tanks
from the moment they arrived. This meant that all unit stores
had to be ready for shipment within six weeks. Having achieved
this incredible feat, subsequent deadlines were just as
demanding: advance party and main body in-country by 29 December
1967 and 30 January 1968 respectively; and the Workshop ready to
support the tanks by 28 February 1968.
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| In-Country Modifications |
Other vehicle modifications involved the removal of
headlights, as well as the development and fitting of 'omega'
brackets to the glacis plate at the front of the tank to allow
two spare roadwheels to be carried. It would have been useful if
these modifications could have been done at 4 Base Workshop,
prior to replacement vehicles being sent to Vietnam; however,
only modifications which had been through the 'official'
authorisation process could be so implemented. Most of the
changes requested by the Squadron as a result of operational
experience, therefore, had to be undertaken at Nui Dat. As a
result, a set of modifications was specifically designed and
whenever a new tank arrived in-country, 106 Field Workshop
carried out the 'in-country modifications' as quickly as
possible, so that the vehicle was ready for issue through
Forward Delivery Troop.
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| Topic: Hoa Long | The final phase of Operation HARDIHOOD, the setting up of 1ATF's base at Nui Dat, took place from April to June 1966. It resulted in the villagers from Long Tan and Long Phuoc being forcibly resettled in different places, some going to Hoa Long. This was part of the reason that a village so close to Nui Dat never fully embraced the Australian presence. A population of around 4,000 provided plenty of scope for the VC to establish themselves and by 1969 an extensive political and military infrastructure was known to exist. A number of operations which targeted the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) did much to improve the situation. Despite these, however, enemy infiltration continued. |
| The Enemy |
For military
command purposes, the ARVN divided SVN into four Corps Tactical
Zones (CTZ). Phuoc Tuy Province was located within the III Corps
area. For their purposes, the enemy command [COSVN] identified a
number of areas throughout SVN which, because of the nature of
terrain, vegetation, and proximity to supply routes, could be
developed into major base camps and sanctuaries. Those located
within the III CTZ are shown on the map above. All contained
extensive base camps, many dating from the First Indochina War.
The Hat Dich and the Long Hais were to become particularly well
known to the crews of 1st Armoured Regiment. A smaller base area
within northern Phuoc Tuy was used as a staging ground for units
moving between the May Taos and the Hat Dich. Known as Thua Tich,
the name of the closest (abandoned) village, it was also the
'home' of the Rear Services Group 84, the unit responsible for
the logistic support of 274 VC Regiment, as well as D445 and
D440 Battalions.
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| Special Equipment Troop into the Fray | The Squadron LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens, set off in his M113A1 with the two dozers (commanded by Sergeants Bob Snape and Graeme Millington), a bridgelayer (Sergeant Andy Zsolt), a fitters' track (Sergeant Kevin Craig), and an ARV (Sergeant Peter de Jong); one of the few occasions SEQ Troop vehicles would operate together. The C Squadron group were to become part of a composite force under the operational control of 2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav (Captain Bruce Richards). |
| Operation PINNAROO : The Long Hais | This was one occasion in which the Troop Leader and Platoon Commander needed to talk directly to each other. Without hesitation, Butler jumped down from the turret. The forward scout from one of the sections had been killed and it was agreed that, in the circumstances, the best means of evacuation was to place the solder's body on the back of the Troop Leader's vehicle. The tanks then escorted the infantry out of the jungle, firing canister at one point to secure their flank. It was a very sombre experience for everyone involved. |
| Operation COOKTOWN ORCHID : Order Imposed on Crisis | COOKTOWN ORCHID IV got off to a spectacular start on 6 April. The minefield was breached in two different places by the tank troops. They first fired canister to cut the barbed wire fences on either side. This technique was employed to ensure that the wire did not become caught up in the vehicles' tracks as they moved through. Seven mines were detonated as the tanks crossed the minefield, clearing passages for the APCs to follow. Once the complete force was through to the other side, a base was established from which combined arms teams comprising a tank troop, infantry platoon and APC section, could commence patrolling. |
| Dealing with Minefields |
An iron beam
was supported forward of and across the tank by a gantry
arrangement involving two booms. These were held up by cables
attached to the turret, while the metal beam had a number of
heavy sea anchor chains attached to it. These, in turn, were
stabilised by metal sections which dragged a similar chain
across the ground in front of the tank. The most obvious
drawback to the design was the fact that the anchor pylon on top
of the turret had to be lifted by crane to allow the crew to
enter and exit. Leaving the vehicle quickly in the event of a
fire required very careful planning, to say the least. As well
as the set up at the front, a similar arrangement was attached
to the back.
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| Topic: The Roles and Tasks of 1 ATF |
As is to be
expected, specific directions concerning the employment of 1ATF
troops had been put in place by the Australian Government. On
authority from USMACV, the Commander II FFV could allocate
troops to any of the following tasks: 'secure and dominate the
assigned Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in Phuoc Tuy
Province; conduct operations related to the security of Highway
15 (linking Vung Tau and Saigon) as required; [and] conduct
other operations in Phuoc Tuy as required'. A fourth task
related to the 'conduct of operations in the surrounding
provinces as agreed between COMAFV and COMUSMACV'.
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| Operation TOAN THANG | One driver,Trooper David Weigall, noted at the time that the idea was 'to get our opinions as to whether the tanks could make the 90 mile trip'. Weigall left the meeting with the belief that the trip would be made soon and that it would 'be a chance for the tanks to prove their worth'. Everyone knew that vehicle preparation had to be 'spot on' and it was no surprise that all attention was immediately turned to servicing and Complete Equipment Schedule (CES) checks. The call forward to FSB Coral was received on 21 May 1968. Everyone was up at 0500hrs the next day and the Squadron set off, right on time, two hours later. |
| Defence of FSB Balmoral | It was realised soon after the assault commenced, that the enemy strength was much larger than originally estimated---at least a platoon, dug in... probably a bunker system. In the circumstances, an air strike was considered the best means to deal with the position, so as to avoid too much delay in the arrival of the tanks at FSB Balmoral. Whilst this was being arranged, the ARV was used to prepare a landing zone for a helicopter to 'dustoff' an infantryman who had been wounded during the contact. At the same time, a quick inspection was conducted of the area engaged by 32Alpha. This revealed one enemy body---the first confirmed enemy casualty from action by Australia tanks since WWII. It was no surprise that his uniform showed him to an NVA regular: pith helmet, greens, and webbing. |
| Going on the Offensive : FSB Coral |
By the time
that the tanks arrived, C Company had been subjected to a number
of counterattacks. Immediate, decisive action was required.
McCormack established contact with the Platoon Commander 9
Platoon and drove straight towards the sound of battle, two
tanks abreast. The ARV and fitters' track were ordered to remain
with the APC Troop Headquarters, while the three carriers from 1
Section followed the path made by the tanks, ready to collect
the casualties, as and when evacuation was possible.
|
| Taking Stock |
During the
next couple of nights both FSB Coral and Balmoral received
'shoot and scoot' attacks. RCL rounds were fired into FSB Coral
on at least two occasions. FSB Balmoral even had RPGs fired into
it during the day. It was in these circumstances that 1 Armoured
Squadron Workshop undertook its second Centurion engine change
in the field. Helped by the crew of callsign 31Bravo, the
Forward Repair Team worked through the night at FSB Coral.
Lights were shielded as much as possible by tarpaulins. Come the
morning, the tank was fit for action.
|
| Topic: Separation of Powers : 1 ATF and Local Government |
Interestingly, the minefields being cleared adjacent to the
bridge over the Song Rai had been established by 7RAR in May
1967. Around 1200 M16 mines were laid at that time to help
improve the defences of the RF/PF posts guarding the bridge.
'This example of Australians laying mines, although they did it
very well, was a good case of misplaced trust in minefields and
their oversight by Regional and Popular Forces'. As with the
barrier minefield from the Horseshoe to the coast, minefields
such as this became a source of supply for the VC. Without
effective coverage by observation and fire, this became
inevitable. 1ATF may have been able to pre-empt this if
Australia had opted for an advisory, as well as a military, role
in Phuoc Tuy. This
would have helped to ensure that RF/PF responsibilities were met
and that minefields served the purpose for which they were laid.
|
| Operation BULLER : Quick Response Mission | Disrupting enemy supply routes was to be the focus of coming operations for Badman. The week or so immediately following the Squadron's return to Nui Dat from Coral/Balmoral involved: vehicle maintenance; infantry--tank training with 4RAR/NZ (who had recently relieved 2RAR/NZ); and on-going gunnery training. Operation BULLER commenced on 16 June 1968. It had as its specific mission the destruction of an enemy staging camp about 2--3km west of Duc Thanh. SAS patrols had heard chain saws being used in the vicinity and had got close enough to observe VC preparing the camp. A Company 3RAR, together with 2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav were placed under command of C Squadron and three SAS soldiers were allocated as guides. |
| Operation ULLADULLA : "Sampans Coming!" |
On 18 June
1968, having just returned from Operation BULLER, 2 Troop were
assigned to participate in infantry--tank training with V
Company 4RAR/NZ at the Horseshoe. Two days later, orders were
received for Operation ULLADULLA. Crews were immediately warned
to have 'tanks fit and ready to do 300 miles', the Commander's
Diary noting that this was to be a 'comprehensive Squadron
operation'.
Footnote:
The CO 1st Armoured Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel 'Chamois'
Wilton happened to be visiting at that time and that night was
invited to 'formally' open the Officers' Mess: 'Brigadier Ron
Hughes, Commander 1ATF, several colonels and many other officers
from Nui Dat were present. Before the night was finished, they
had themselves in an awful mess---drunk. Must admit, I had a
sore head this morning too. I was the barman'.
|
| Operation BLUE MOUNTAINS : Reconnaissance in Force |
In a
symbolic sense, July 1968 marked the midpoint of C Squadron's
tour of duty. Although many of those serving with the Squadron
would RTA at different times, B Squadron would officially take
over in February 1969. So much had been achieved over the
previous months, it would have been hard to appreciate its
significance at the time. The Squadron area had been
established, the tanks had arrived, new gunnery procedures had
been taught, techniques of coping with the terrain had been
learnt and tactics for supporting infantry had been developed
and proven.
|
| Operation ARUNTA : Route Security | The enemy's attempts at imposing control over Route 2 were quickly countered---on 19 July 1968 a total of 12 makeshift roadblocks were cleared. Made up of trees, rocks, and the occasional anti-personnel mine, these were mostly located adjacent to areas where rubber trees had been cleared back from the side of the road earlier in the year. Among other things, an extensive cornfield was discovered and later destroyed under the tracks of the tanks. The enemy were definitely active in the area: on one night a party of six VC were engaged by 12 Platoon. A sweep of the area the next morning found heavy blood trails and drag marks; as well as an amount of equipment, including an RPG and four packs. The following night it was 2 Troop's turn, with sentries detecting movement outside the perimeter of the harbour. |
| A New Enemy Offensive | Just after midnight on 11 August 1968, a VC company entered Long Dien market place and engaged the RF Post with RPGs and a 75mm RCL. Although they withdrew before first light, 3 Troop, together with C Company 1RAR, were deployed east of Baria (close to the junction of Route 23 from Dat Do and Route 44 from the Long Hais). Expectation was further heightened when Second Lieutenant Bob Owens was appointed to command 4 Troop, in anticipation of the arrival of the Squadron's remaining tanks from Australia. (F/n: Corporal Phil Reeves from SHQ troop was promoted to become the Troop Sergeant.) The Troop initially took over Forward Delivery Troop tanks and were deployed for base defence at Nui Dat. (F/n: Part of the deployment included a tank being position on Nui Dat hill until 27 August.) This was an additional resource available to the Task Force Commander---should circumstances so warrant. (Second Lieutenant Brian Sullivan had arrived from Australia on 5 August to replace Owens as LO.) |
| Operation NOWRA : From the Jungle to the Streets | "We tried to reverse back to the infantry, however, 33B received RPG fire from the right rear. This round hit him on the left rear roadwheel. We returned fire, HE, Cannister, MG. Whilst this engagement was in progress, he was fired on from the left---this round missed. I engaged this position with HE and MG. We simultaneously received small arms fire from the flanks and rear. We then received RPG fire from the right. The majority of these rounds being directed at 33B, the lead tank. We received approximately eight rounds in all, they were fired from houses to the right of Route 23. We returned fire at the respective targets with HE, Cannister, and MG. We continuously received small arms fire. MGs were firing in the surrounding areas." |
| The Enemy Responds : Mine Warfare. |
At the time
3ZeroDelta was a part of 1 Troop, having replaced 31Charlie
which had mechanical problems. The gunner, Trooper Mick Bidey,
received head wounds as a result of being thrown out of his seat
inside the turret. It later became apparent that the mine had
gone off directly under the middle of the tank, rather than
under one of the tracks. The power of the blast was such that
the bottom of the hull had been bowed upwards by about 20cm. The
effect of this inside the turret was devastating: the casings of
the vehicle batteries, which are mounted on the floor, were
split open, spraying acid throughout the turret and filling the
crew compartment with fumes; in addition to that, a number of 20
pounder rounds, which are also stowed just above the hull floor,
were broken open, causing propellant to spill out. If this was
not bad enough, the Rotary Base Junction (RBJ) had been badly
damaged. This is the electrical unit controlling the traverse of
the turret---it is located on the hull floor and was directly
above the point of the explosion. The combination of acid, toxic
fumes, ammunition propellant and electrical shortcircuits was a
potentially disastrous mixture. As had happened with callsign
31Alpha's fire in April, however, quick action and
coolheadedness on the part of the crew and Troop saved the day.
|
| Addendum: 'Denton, the Dynamic Duckling'. |
The day after
the enemy were forced to withdraw from Long Dien, B and D
Companies 1RAR, supported by 1 Troop, conducted a search of the
battle area. At one point, a mother duck, followed by a line of
ducklings, crossed the road directly in front of McCormack's
tank. The driver, Trooper Kev Hunter, decided that the last
duckling would make an ideal mascot. He quickly jumped out,
scooped it up and passed it back to Trooper Jack Luff, the
gunner. Luff became the duckling's unofficial custodian and
named it Fenton after the main character in 'Chickenman', a
popular radio serial broadcast on US Armed Forces radio at the
time.
|
| Topic: R&C Centre |
Despite the hectic pace of
operations throughout the period that the tanks served in
SVN, efforts were made to ensure that crews were able to be
rotated (often with the help of Forward Delivery Troop) to
allow an occasional trip to Vung Tau. Apart from the once
only week long R&R leave, this provided the only opportunity
for a break from the constant strain of operations, vehicle
servicing, and base duties. In a letter home in April 1968,
Trooper David Weigall described a swimming trip he
participated in:
After getting through
the barbed wire past the check point, we had a swim. The
South China Sea. The beach has sand as good as Mornington
and a good surf was up. The water was warm and fantastic. It
must have been a great resort before the troubles here. We
had lunch and beers at the "Beachcomber" US entertainment
joint. It was a great break, we got back to Nui Dat at 5pm.
|
| Operation TRACK DUSTER : Rice Denial | The first night involved combined arms teams adopting positions from which they could ambush the Song Thi Vai and its tributaries. In some cases tanks were camouflaged prior to moving into their final positions. Expectations were high, however, it was only to be 4 Troop, together with a section from 12 Platoon, that were to see any action. (It may have been relevant that the Troop's ambush site was that which was located furthest to the north, in the vicinity of Ap Tham Thien, minimising the likelihood of their presence being forewarned.) During the night something moving on the water was spotted. Everyone immediately 'stood-to', and, on command, illuminated with white light. |
| Operation PISTOL BALL : Base Camp Destruction |
There was
no doubt that the area was one that the VC had returned to
in the past. In addition to the targeted installations, the
tanks found an illicit corn crop and banana plantation, as
well as makeshift shelters for the VC involved in harvesting
and planting. Bags of CS gas crystals, as well as a number
of bunkers, were also found. In penetrating the jungle to
reach areas such as these, the lead tank would sometimes end
up with vegetation packed so densely against its glacis
plate that the build up would have to be pulled off by an
APC using a tow rope.
|
| Operation DIAMOND PIN : Movement Interdiction | One of the hardest things to do in an insurgency conflict is to restrict the enemy's freedom of movement. This was the task given to Badman in Operation DIAMOND PIN. Commencing on 30 October 1968, C Squadron were required to interdict enemy movement across a 6km stretch of Route 2 from Xa Bang, north to the Province border. Large groups of enemy had been reported crossing the road in both directions, using the adjacent rubber plantations for cover. As a means of helping to disguise his move into AO Rapier, the Squadron Commander made it appear that a reconnaissance--in--force operation was being conducted along the entire length of Route 2. |
| Operation IRON HAND : Tango Force to Duc Thanh | Second Lieutenant Wilson reacted quickly, calling for 'dustoff' and bringing his tank up alongside McConnell's. His Troop Sergeant' was still very much alert to the tactical situation and yelled out to everyone to stay inside their vehicles because of the possibility of other mines being present. The reasoning behind the M16 mine being positioned close to the anti-tank mine was now very apparent. Both McConnell and Hannaford were helped onto the back of callsign 33 and taken to an area suitable for 'dustoff'. Whilst waiting for the helicopter, the US adviser with the ARVN administered morphine to McConnell. |
| Operation CAPITAL II : In Support Again |
C
Squadron's period at FSB Lion was not confined solely to the
conduct of reconnaissance-in-force operations in the
vicinity, the tanks' indirect firepower capability was also
used to great advantage. During Operation PINNAROO the
Centurions' long range direct fire capability had been
employed to good effect, now was the opportunity to make
further use of the remarkable accuracy afforded by the 20
pounder gunnery system.
|
| Topic: Infantry and tanks working together | In general, the infantry 'regarded tanks as noisy, clumsy monsters which delighted in bumping into trees so that water, red ants, snakes, branches or even the entire tree fell onto the foot soldiers. Worse, the tankies were able to carry items regarded as luxuries by the crunchies who had to live from the packs on their backs'. There is no escaping from the fact that 'tankies' are different from infantry---it is hard to make tanks blend into the ground in such a way that you can pretend that they are not there. In terms of night harbours, for example, they smell and they have components that heat up during the day and suddenly go 'twang' in the middle of the night when they cool down. Like any 'marriage', however, there is always a bit of give and take, especially if a successful relationship is to be achieved. |
| Operation GOODWOOD : Protecting the Bases |
Major Alan Vickers assumed command of the first C Squadron just
prior to what was to become one of 1ATF's most intense operational
periods. His replacement as 2IC, Captain Jim Hull, arrived on 26
November 1968. The enemy had managed to avoid large scale contact
during Operation CAPITAL, a strategy intended to gain him time to
amass the forces needed to achieve maximum impact in a co-ordinated
offensive. The North's political goal was that of strengthening
their negotiating position at the re-opening of the Paris Peace
Talks on 25 January 1969. Although the ultimate focus of the NVA
high command was Saigon, a successful offensive launched against US
military installations at Bearcat and Long Binh/Bien Hoa would place
considerable pressure on the Capital.
The following day 2 Troop came under operational control of C Company for the detailed clearance of the bunker system. As most of the Company's casualties had, up until that time occurred in, or near, bunker systems, the presence of the tanks 'was a tremendous morale booster'. The enemy on this occasion, however, had fled. 2 Troop, with 9 Platoon for protection, were tasked to destroy the bunkers, whilst the remainder of C Company continued to patrol the AO. Soon after, the Company came under fire from another fortified position. 2 Troop moved forward quickly to marry-up with the infantry |
| The Worse Possible News |
On
Friday, 13 December 1968. 3 Troop were completing servicing
tasks at FSB Julia. Although well into the 'Dry', that
afternoon it poured with rain. Not only did the dust turn to
mud, the sleeping trenches next to the tanks that the
engineers had dug for the turret crews, filled with water.
Everyone would have to sleep inside their vehicles. The
drivers always did anyway, laying their seats right back
just above the floor. On this occassion, however, quite a
bit of water had collected inside all the driving
compartments. To avoid having to sleep in a pool of water,
they got underneath their tanks and removed the forward
drain plugs. The next morning the ground around the vehicles
was very muddy. All the drivers, therefore, put their drain
plugs back in from inside the vehicle, intending to put them
in properly from underneath when they got to somewhere dry.
|
| Operation GOODWOOD : Perseverance Pays Off | 1 Troop continued to support 1RAR in AO Sherman Saddle. Although the Troop were not called upon in terms of providing fire support, the pressure being applied on the enemy continued to produce results, especially in terms of denying the enemy freedom of movement in the area. The following day, Australia Day 1969, the Troop were released by 1RAR to return to FSB Julia. At 1408hrs, callsign 31Alpha (Sergeant Len Swarbrick) struck a mine whilst the Troop were moving along the same 'firetrail' north-east of Phu My that had claimed Hannaford's tank. This was undoubtably an anti-tank mine and, while there were no casualties among the crew, ARN 169077's front left suspension station was badly damaged. Interestingly, D Company 1RAR were to come upon a Chinese Communist anti-tank mine during their patrolling later that day. |
|
Topic: Recognising suspicious objects |
'We turned onto a well defined track to access the FSB which was about 500 metres from Route 2. The driver of our lead vehicle noticed a small piece of cable sitting proud of the ground. He quickly halted and we backed up on our tracks. I was sent forward to assist the field engineer who was attached to us, to clear the area. Using our bayonets to feel under the earth, we followed the cable to a switch fashioned from three pieces of bamboo, nails and a 6 volt Dolphin torch battery. The cable ran back the other way to a detonator inserted into a piece of high explosive which looked similar in shape to a big block of cheese.' |
|
The New Squadron Takes Over |
Infantry units in Vietnam were replaced as complete entities. The circumstances in which C Squadron were originally deployed, meant that this was just not possible for any of the tank squadrons. For a start, many of those arriving at Nui Dat in February 1968, had less than 12 months of their national service remaining and had to be replaced on an individual basis. Added to this, 3 and 4 Troops were deployed three and six months, respectively, after the first half of the Squadron. It would have taken an enormous pool of trained manpower to replace C Squadron complete in February 1969; resources which which were simply not available. |
|
Operation GOODWOOD : Constant Vigilance |
Without doubt, considerable damage would have been caused to any vehicle setting it off. The effort that the enemy had gone to, and the quantity of explosives that they were prepared to employ, suggests that the tanks had become important targets. Indeed, any VC who destroyed a tank was greatly honoured. A Hoi Chanh remarked on this: 'In D445 there is only a man named QUANG who is a "Hero of the Liberation Front" because he knocked-out a tank with a B40 [RPG-2 round]'. Unfortunately, the fact that the enemy had increased the size of their mines to knock out tanks, meant that damage could be catastrophic, should a much lighter APC strike one. |
|
Hat Dich Encounter |
Whilst moving his tank past callsign 21Alpha to get into a
fire position, Sullivan saw Ingram, still in the driver's
compartment, with the burning mantlet cover about to fall on
top of him. Sullivan immediately suppressed the area to his
front and right with canister and the commander's machine
gun. Haward clearly remembers that: 'when this occurred, the
VC once again kept their heads down which allowed the medics
to move forward and assist us back to the clearing'. By this
time Clark had brought his tank up on the left and was able
to help suppress the enemy fire. The Troop Leader grasped
the moment to jump down from his tank and run across to
21Alpha.
|
|
Operations KOROBA & FEDERAL: 'TET' '69 |
'The
time has come for us to move into Baria. Don't really know
how I feel. Guess I'm scared, but don't feel too bad. [
] is okay I think, as he has been through it before. It's
about 4 o'clock [am] and we've been told that we're not
needed yet. With a bit of luck we won't have to move into
Baria until this morning, much to the pleasure of everyone.
The old belly was turning over for a while, but is okay now.
Just hope and pray to God that there are very few RPGs
around. About five past four..have started up and are ready
to move. Looks like only two tanks are going...all three
go.'
|
| Topic: Vietnamese culture/Sleep depravation |
The
Vietnamese culture and the beauty of the land were
things that could not be ignored during the months spent
traversing different parts of the countryside: water
buffalo pulling ploughs through rice paddies, the skills
of an old man repairing a wooden cart wheel, the ornate
architecture of Buddhist temples and the like. This was
often offset, of course, by the evident poverty.
Whenever tanks stopped close to a village, groups of
smiling children would quickly appear, calling out: 'Uc
Dai Loi [Australians] Number One!'. They hoped they
might be given some left-over rations---and usually
were.
The
constant pressure of meeting the operational demands
placed the tank squadrons took its toll on everyone. The
impact on Trooper Ron Baikie was shared by many:
'Physically, the hardest thing to cope with was the
stress, coupled with sleep depravation. After a few
weeks I was so knackered, I inadvertently fell asleep
one night whilst on watch, my legs buckled and I almost
fell on the 'boss'.' The American experience was
similar: 'Because operations were practically endless,
the men were tormented by severe fatigue…the Army
[never] properly appreciated its impact on both men and
operations'
|
| Doing What's Asked |
In contemplating such frenetic activity, it must be
remembered that the technology on which the Centurion
was designed and built was well over 20 years old. The
way that the crews and RAEME personnel responded to the
challenge of keeping the tanks battleworthy was nothing
short of fantastic. An example of a typical situation
was described in the diary entry made by Trooper Tony
Hale, callsign 22Alpha's driver, concerning their return
from Binh Ba:
Gearbox gave out. Towed
most of the way by ARV until it busted [its] fan belts.
Lifted covers and was just about burnt by steam. Rest of
the way back in 2nd [gear]. [Callsign] 22 towed ARV.
After a new gearbox was put in, it was discovered that the tank needed to go to 106 Field Workshop for other work. Entries in Hale's diary for the following week included: Wednesday: Worked like niggers all morning to get tank ready to go to workshops. Thursday: New suspension housings put on tank. Started 7.30 [am] and about 5 [pm] when finished. A bloody hard days work. Friday: Worked on tank again. Sideplates cut and welded on for front guards. Really good job. Bit of a panic to get it finished and back to lines and loaded back up.
While many C Squadron personnel would have been replaced with incoming B Squadron crewmen, the constant strain must have been starting to tell. Without doubt, there would have been many in 3 Troop who would have been wishing that it had been them, not 1 Troop, who had returned to Nui Dat and hot showers. According to Lance Corporal John Wedmaier: 'We lived on "brews" because we got that way that we were so fatigued that food didn't interest us. The powdered milk, lots of sugar and coffee kept us going.' |
| The First Time Together |
One
of the SHQ tanks, callsign 2ZeroEcho commanded by
Corporal 'Fred' Fedorowytsch, was travelling with 3
Troop at the time. This was quite a common situation for
SHQ crews; they were often attached to different Troops
in place of tanks that were undergoing repair. This
particular attachment was one that Fedorowytsch would
remember well. Having travelled about 5km from FSB
Wattle and going up a slight rise, the engine of his
tank stalled. Immediately this happened, a sheet of
flame came through into the turret from the engine
compartment. The gunner, Trooper Martin Zeugofsge, was
engulfed by: 'flames rising from under the seat and
coming to and above my head, naturally I began to bail
out. As I turned to do so, flames seemed to be coming
from under the commander's seat'. As well as ordering
the crew to bail out, Fedorowytsch shouted at the driver
to pull the handle for the fixed carbon dioxide fire
extinguisher system. Fortunately, the quick action that
comes from good training, minimised both crew injury and
vehicle damage (as had been the case with the fire
involving callsign 31Alpha a year earlier).
The Vietnamese Armoured Corps Day involved a parade,
speeches, and a display of armoured vehicles in Saigon.
The newly promoted Captain Gerry McCormack, then the ADC
to the Commander AFV, convinced him that a Centurion
should be included in the display. The responsibility
then fell (as it tends to do in the Army) to Warrant
Officer Trevor Dingle to select a crew from Forward
Delivery Troop and organise their movement. Trooper
David Hay, who had recently arrived in-country, found it
hard to believe his luck when selected as the gunner.
|
| Topic: Tank ambushes |
The After Action Report for a Tango Force operation
conducted towards the end of 1969 makes some relevant
points:
'Tank and APC crews require
special skills whilst ambushing. The most difficult
skill to obtain is the art of living on and being
constantly ready to fight from AFVs, whilst remaining
absolutely quiet for extended periods. It was found that
as the operation progressed, troops became more adept
and finally were very skillful'.
|
| Operation MAILED FIST : Tango Force II |
The
ambush on the night of 3 May was south west of Binh Ba,
well away from where Tango Force had been operating
previously. While there was no contact once again, Hull
appreciated that patience was the key to operations such
as this. Indeed, perseverance paid off the very next
day. An extensive bunker system was discovered during a
reconnaissance--in--force in the vicinity of the Binh Ba
rubber plantation. Surprisingly, almost half the bunkers
had been constructed during the past week. While the
significance of this would become apparent in coming
weeks, efforts at the time were concentrated on
collapsing the bunkers under the weight of the tanks.
|
| In the Face of RPGs |
The arduous
process of half-tracking was begun whilst
waiting for the 'dustoff'. About two hours
later, 24Bravo was ready to drive again. (A
little later it would be found that the track
would not stay on, and, as the ARV was not with
the Troop, the tank had to be hooked up to
another and towed.) Callsign 24Charlie (Corporal
Graham Munsell) took over as lead vehicle for
the move back to the Night Defensive Position (NDP)
about 1000m away. Munsell had gone only about
200m, however, when his tank was hit by an RPG.
The rocket struck the vehcile (ARN 169041)
on the left of the hull, between the top of the
track and the bottom of the track bins. It was a
'lucky' shot for the enemy, a few centimetres up
or down and the jet would have been deflected.
As it was, it penetrated the hull, passed across
the inside of the fighting compartment, and
finally came to a stop against the hull wall on
the opposite side. Three months since the first
Centurion had been penetrated by an RPG, it had
happened again.
[The next day...] Suddenly, with about 50m to go, Doerr's tank was hit by an RPG. The rocket flew across the face of the driver, Trooper Wayne Stevens, literally burning his eyebrows before striking the hood bin to his left. The blast caused burns and abrasions to both his eyes. The Troop Leader was suffering similar difficulties with his sight, though fortunately not nearly as bad. Nevertheless, for the moment his tank was out of action. These were not the only wounds, however. After striking the driver's hood bin on callsign 23, the RPG jet had continued on into the left hand forward track bin and out the other side. It was probably the impact of the initial strike, rather than the jet itself, which was responsible for shrapnel flying across to the turret of 23Alpha and wounding Sergeant de Turt. Although hit in several places around his right shoulder, de Turt was was able to continue fighting his tank. Fortunately, the volume of fire maintained by he and his crew was such that the enemy abandoned any thought of further action. |
| In the Face of Mines |
Extensive damage was done to the hull floor of Centurion
ARN 169005. Like the previous two vehicles that had hit
offset mines, it had been effectively 'knocked out' by
enemy action and needed to be sent back to Australia for
whatever rebuilding or salvage as might be possible.
There could be no doubt now about the enemy's ability to
defeat the Centurion's armour, either with RPGs or
mines. The resources that had been devoted to assembling
and setting up a mine of such size signalled to Smith
that: 'the enemy saw us [the tanks] as a big threat that
needed to be countered'. Immediately after the incident,
he flew to FSB Thrust to discuss future tactics with the
Commanding Officer 9RAR. The implications of the enemy
increasing the strength of their mines were not lost on
the crews of the much more lightly armoured M113A1s (nor
their passengers!). The Armoured Corps bond was a very
close one, however, and everyone drew comfort from their
high level of training.
|
| Topic: The pressure on sentries | The possibility that noise outside the perimeter at night was being made by someone from your own unit could never be completely discounted. If circumstances permitted, accounting for everyone was definitely the best option. This was not always feasible, however, and sentries had to respond according to the threat they perceived at the time. As is inevitable during war, 'own fire' incidents occasionally occurred during 1 ATF operations. Despite stringent emphasis on rules of engagement and sentry procedures, there would always be some circumstances which would create confusion. This was particularly so at night and in situations where ARVN forces were involved. |
| The Enemy Fires First | It did not take long for the two vehicles to reach Binh Ba. At 0720hrs, just as callsign 2ZeroEcho was entering the village, it was fired on from the house closest to the road. Trooper Peter Chapman, callsign 2ZeroEcho's operator, was standing on his seat looking out over the top of the turret, when he heard small arms fire raking the side of the tank. He immediately dived into the turret to prepare the guns for 'action'. Almost at the same moment, however, an RPG 7 rocket struck the tank. It would have been hard for an RPG team to miss the side of a Centurion with an aimed shot at less than 30m range. The B41 round penetrated the left side of the turret, between the external stowage bins and above the pistol port. Chapman was both blinded and deafened by the explosion. |
| Ready Reaction Force Deploys | The other callsigns which would move off straight away were: 21 (Second Lieutenant Brian Sullivan, the designated Troop Leader), 21Charlie (Corporal Geoff Bennett), and 22 (Second Lieutenant Dave Ritchie). Not only was this a composite troop, many tanks were manned by composite crews. In 22Bravo, for example, Corporal Barry Bennier's gunner and driver were from 22Charlie; Troopers Peter Matuschka and Bill Morris. Callsign 22's driver, Trooper Rodney Fogg, was on R&C, and Trooper Robert Stuart from 21Bravo took his place, joining Pobar and Trooper Kingsley McGuire (operator). Like Hay, Morris and Matuscha had to dash to join up with the Troop: 'Peter and myself were at 106 Workshop having modifications done to 22Charlie, while the other half of our crew were down in Vung Tau on R&C'. Bill noticed that, in contrast with his own tank, there were neither grenades nor field dressings in the driver's compartment of the tank he was taking over. 'I wish that I had them later on', he subsequently recalled. |
| Binh Ba : The First Sweep | "29, This is 21, From Sunray 22Bravo. He's not that bad. It's just that he can't see for a length of time, which makes loading extremely difficult. Over". Not only had the firing circuits had been cut, but Hay was temporarily blinded and could neither see to load nor manually fire the coaxial machine guns. The only weapon they really had left was the commander's .30 cal. Fortunately, the fire support from the Bushrangers had kept pressure on the enemy, providing an opportunity for the reaction force to consolidate and regroup. Someone who was in need of such an opportunity was 22Bravo's driver. The tank's mantlet cover had been set on fire by the RPG strike and burning bits of canvas were dropping down onto him in the driver's compartment. Unpreturbed by the proximity of the enemy, Morris stood up and tore away the offending material. |
| Binh Ba : The Second Sweep |
The
fighting was intense, right from the moment of shaking
out into formation. Sergeant Browning explained in his
After Action Report that, 'as the sweep continued,
different targets were indicated to me and depending on
whichever callsign was closest, we engaged it'. An
example of a typical action was one which occurred about
half way through the village:
"...at a particular house approx 20 yards [18m] to my
front, some searching infantry were fired on with
automatic weapons, resulting in the Platoon Commander
being wounded. I then informed 24Bravo and 24Charlie of
my intentions. I pushed forward to within 15 feet [5m]
of the house, while the infantry withdrew to the rear of
my callsign with their wounded. I engaged the house with
.30 cal and also used canister."
|
| Operation HAMMER : Consolidation | With the sixth sense that crew commanders sometimes experience, Dziedzic noticed a deep ditch to his left. It was covered in foliage and in such a position that he couldn't engage it with tank armament. 'I called out to the supporting infantry that I was throwing a grenade into the hole. It ended up that it contained a 75mm RCL which the infantry subsequently placed on the transmission covers of my tank'. |
| Topic: Wildlife/RAEME support |
Glowworms and fireflies were to cause problems on a
numerous occasions. The larvae of the tropical
firefly glows continuously, whilst the firefly itself
(or 'lightning bug') sends out brief flashes of light.
There is nothing more disconcerting for the person on
picquet in the early hours of the morning, to not only
hear strange noises, but also see lights flashing on and
off in front of him.
An ARV or fitter's track
always accompanied a tank troop on operations and the
RAEME crew were an integral part of the troop in every
sense. When moving, they were responsible for an arc of
observation and fire, the same as tank crews. This also
applied in ambushes. They stood picquet with everyone
else and were just as susceptible to enemy action; in
some cases more so, as neither of the RAEME vehicles had
the same levels of protection as the tank. In
reinforcing this relationship, Major Smith made the
following point in a report to Army Headquarters (AHQ):
'RAEME attached are as much part of the fighting team as
anyone else and are exposed to hostile action just as
constantly'.
|
|
Operation TONG : Reaction Force to Hoa Long |
Trooper Hale's R&C in Vung Tau finished on 7 June. He
noted in his diary that the truck 'flew' back to Nui Dat
in case they were needed. Indeed, as soon as he got back
he was told to get his gear together as quickly as
possible, there was something happening. The Composite
Troop, under Second Lieutenant David Ritchie, was on
ready reaction stand-by and come midday it appeared
certain that they would be called out again. Reports had
been coming in during the morning that VC had moved into
Hoa Long, just 4km to the south of Nui Dat. Alarmingly,
two prisioners taken by the RF stated that the enemy
force numbered around 200. As they had become entrenched
and were holding off RF attacks, 1ATF assistance was
requested.
|
| Mines : Anti-Tank and Anti-Personnel | The incident provides a perfect example of the unflagging support provided to the armoured squadrons by the 'Bluebells' (RAEME). Second Lieutenant Sweeney had two choices, either to tow callsign 24Alpha back to FSB Virginia and have a forward repair team fit a new suspension station there, or have it taken down the road for repair at Nui Dat. In the end, recovery by ARV back to Nui Dat was the only sensible option, as the track into FSB Virginia was over a metre deep in mud and a towed vehicle would never have made it. The casualty reached 106 Field Workshop some two hours later; it was slotted it into their list of priorities, and was battleworthy and ready to go at 0500hrs the next morning. |
| Pacification and Land Clearing | The RPG on 7 July was quite likely a warning to keep away from the enemy's long established sanctuary. If so, it did not achieve its purpose. As the land clearing progressed through July, it got closer and closer to the Long Hais, until it was almost at the base of the slopes themselves. The presence of the tanks, combined with the active infantry ambush and patrol program, must have had a considerable deterrent effect---despite the proximity of the 1ATF forces to their sanctuary, the enemy generally kept their distance. Undoubtedly the vigilance of the crews played a large part in this. |
| Duc Thanh | The team lived with the US advisers and had a number of duties, including: gathering intelligence from local sources; providing operational advice to the Commander, 1ATF; co-ordinating civil affairs projects; and liaising with Allied forces operating within the Duc Thanh AO. The first B Squadron LO was Sergeant 'Archie' Wilson. He took up the post soon after arriving at Nui Dat in February 1969. His responsibilities were greater than those normally expected of an Non Commissioned Oficer (NCO) and his dedication and commitment were recognised by both SVN and Australia. As well as receiving the Vietnamese Psychological Warfare Medal, he was also Mentioned In Despatches. |
| Ready and Waiting |
Despite the conditions, 2 Troop were able to respond
quickly to a request from Task Force Headquarters on 5
July 1969. They were required to move to Route 2 and
meet up with 2 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav. Both troops were
then to secure an area near the Courtenay Rubber
Plantation, in readiness for an ARVN unit to establish
what was to become FSB Buffalo. The presence of the
armoured vehicles in the area caught a group of enemy by
surprise. Although they quickly ran back into the
jungle, it was too late---they had been seen. Both the
tanks and APCs immediately engaged the vicinity (the
tanks using HE), before following up. The alertness and
quick thinking of the crews resulted in two bodies being
found, together with a number of heavily blood stained
packs.
|
|
Operation WAIOURU : Another Sampan Down |
It was well known that the enemy used the Thai Thien area as a distribution point for supplies from the Rung Sat Special Zone. The firepower of the tanks and 'Dusters' was not to be wasted; together with a platoon of infantry and a section of carriers, an ambush was established overlooking the Song Thi Vai on 8 July. The position selected was only a couple of hundred metres north of that used by 3 Troop C Squadron just over 12 months previously. |
| Topic: Enemy bunkers |
The
bunkers were constructed using an interwoven system of
logs and earth that made their roofs almost
indestructible (as any occupants would be hoping,
particularly if subjected to a B52 bomb strike). While
on some occasions bunkers would collapse under the
weight of a tank, on others their roofs did not give way
at all. One engineer officer who was involved in
destroying a number of enemy positions, recalls that the
bunkers were often: '...dug well down, with between one
and two metres thickness compacted overhead protection,
supported by very large log beams, generally about 300
to 400mm diameter and cross beams above...'.
|
| Operation GINGER : Tango Force III |
Next
day it became apparent just how big an area was
involved. Overall, about 6 hectares [15 acres] were
under cultivation. Although the main crop was corn,
other vegetables such as pumpkins were planted
throughout. There is no doubt that supplies from here
would have provided a major boost to the enemy's food
stocks. Indeed, it may have been that preparations were
already being made to harvest the crop. During the
afternoon, an RF patrol operating in conjunction with
Tango Force encountered a camp containing around eight
VC. This was only a kilometre or so south of the
cultivation. The RF sweep through the camp resulted in
one KIA and one WIA (blood trail). Mortars were used to
engage likely withdrawal routes.
|
| Operation PLATYPUS : Tango Force IV |
The
remainder of the day, 12 August, was spent trying to
investigate the area to the south of the AO where 'SEAL
Air' had previously identified tracks. Unfortunately the
going was found to be too wet for the tanks. Not to be
defeated, however, targets designated by intelligence
sources were engaged during H&I fire missions that night
by both the tanks and mortars. The next morning, Tango
Force set off at first light for the area immediately
north of Phu My. Negotiating the ground carefully,
patrols were conducted in this vicinity throughout the
day. The morale of the ARVN troops at the Military Post
would have been bolstered by this sizeable show of
force. The last night of Operation PLATYPUS was spent in
the same area, further H&I missions being fired.
|
| Operation GINGER EXTENDED : Tango Force V | Crew discipline and battle procedures must have been good, because soon after taking up position, at 1820hrs, three VC were seen approaching from the east. They were obviously intent on crossing Route 2 and oblivious to the fact that at least two Centurion gunners were silently bringing their 20 pounders to bear. Because of wide variations in the ranges at which the enemy were likely to be detected, it had been decided to load HE ammunition. The After Action Report describes the consequences graphically: 'two bodies disintegrated [when] engaged by 20 pounder HE from 50m'. |
| Dominating the 'No Go' Areas : The Hat Dich | Maintaining the momentum from that point was to become the responsibility of 5RAR. With a new AO, Mindy, having been established, Operation CAMDEN involved both land clearing and offensive operations; the latter being undertaken by the 501 Engineer Company (US). Equipped with around 30 bulldozers, the US engineers compensated for the fact that 1ATF's landclearing capability was fully engaged in the south of the Province. 1 Troop, having deployed into AO Porphrey on 27 July, were to help protect land clearing operations in the Hat Dich until 27 August. Such a task created enormous strain for those involved, especially that created by the tension between the monotony of the duties on the one hand and the need for constant alertness on the other. |
| Dominating the 'No Go' Areas : The Long Hais |
1
Troop had been on landclearing protection for a month,
and so it was to be for 4 Troop---deployed in support of
6RAR/NZ on Operation MUNINGBURRA; 17 July to 15 August
1969. Unlike Operation CAMDEN, however, Australian
engineers operated the bulldozers; denying cover to the
enemy in the vicinity of the Long Hais and into the
Light Green. The stress on the tank crews was as great,
if not greater, than that experienced in the Hat Dich.
In AOs Rosslea and West End, the enemy still had
relatively easy access to large numbers of M16 mines
from the barrier minefield. In fact, during Operation
MUNDINGBURRA, 211 such mines were discovered.
|
Chapter 16 Flexibility : A Hallmark of Armour (15,800 words)
|
Topic: Mini-teams |
In
the world of mines and booby traps, nothing can be taken for
granted. The commander of the first RAE field troop in
Vietnam provides an insight into the constant danger and
uncertainty experienced by a member of a mini-team: 'He'll
be the one who unfastens the tripwire, and unscrews the
detonator, asking himself if this bomb will be the one that
is booby-trapped itself; or wondering if it's there to lure
him into a sniper's sights'.
|
| Operation CHIEFTAIN : Tango Force VI | On 6 September, whilst travelling south along Route 2, the mini-team suddenly stopped the lead vehicle. Three metres in front was a US manufactured Claymore anti-personnel mine; secured on a tree beside the road about 2.5m above ground---the perfect height to decimate the turret crew of an armoured vehicle! It turned out to have been connected to a pressure switch directly in the path of the tanks. Interestingly, the Claymore had a bundle of propaganda leaflets attached to it. The plan was clear: when the mine was detonated, not only would an AFV be 'knocked out', but also leaflets (which made reference to the magnificent 'success' of VC/NVA forces at Binh Ba some months earlier) would be spread around the scene to proclaim yet another 'victory'. |
|
Operation AWARA : Tango Force VII |
Captain Toll, who would fill in for Hull during his absence with the Tango Force, had one particular administrative task to finalise during the coming weeks, the outcome of which would last long into the future. It is never an easy matter, deciding how best to use the Squadron funds which build up over the course of a year and to which everyone contributes through canteen profits and the like. After a process of consultation, it was decided to commission an artist to paint a picture depicting B Squadron in Vietnam. The most favoured theme was Binh Ba, 6 June 1969. |
| Operation CHIEFTAIN II : Tango Force VIII | On 6 November, 2 Troop came across an offset mine made up of two 105mm shells, coupled with a quantity of explosive. Once again, it was the mini-team who were to be thanked. Found about 1500m west of Ap Ngai Giao, the mine was located in a similar position to that which had been struck by 24Alpha---not far from a road, and close to the edge of a rubber plantation. That night a lot of shooting broke out in the vicinity of Ap Ngai Giao. It was reported that the hamlet was under attack by mortar and small arms fire. After consideration, it was decided that a response by Tango Force was not warranted. Next morning, on the road to Ap Ngai Giao, the mini-team spotted a mine. A co-incidence, or was the firing during the night intended to lure the tanks to the village? |
| Been There, Done That : A Potpourri of Tasks to End On | At this stage, the cause of the explosion was not known. It had to be assumed that it was a mine and that there could be others in the area. Corporal 'Tiny' O'Shea immediately called for Dustoff. Fedorowytsch checked everyone to determine the medical priority, got the engineer medic to look after O'Keefe, told Sanderson and Cleland to help each other up onto the tank (this meant that he would not have to worry about them should there be mines close by) and commenced first aid on Angus. All four members of the crew of 2ZeroEcho (ARN 169084) suffered serious fragmention wounds. O'Keefe and Angus were medevaced to Australia on 17 and 19 November respectively; while Cleland and Sanderson returned to B Squadron, initially on light duties, after treatment at 1 Australian Field Hospital, Vung Tau. |
|
A Succession of Recovery Challenges |
As soon as the contact had been initiated, the US advisers with the RF called for air support. Phantom ground attack aircraft and Cobra helicopter gunships ensured that, for once at least, the ruggedness of the Long Hais did not guarantee the enemy protection. A number of casualties were clearly inflicted. The US advisers knew that as soon as the air attacks stopped, the VC would immediately attempt to recover the bodies of those who had been hit. The only armoured vehicle available to help prevent this was the fitters' track, callsign 88India [the tanks were bogged]. One of the US advisers boarded the 'carrier' and requested that .50cal suppressive fire be brought to bear on the enemy position, whilst the ARVN were preparing to sweep through. [Craftsman 'Ti Ti'] Smith fired 600 to 700 rounds before being told to cease. |
|
Operation TANGLE : Tango Force IX |
Major Alex Smith departed Nui Dat on 23 December 1969; A Squadron coming into being and taking over from B Squadron, as of 24 December. The fact that all tank troops were committed at the time, is indicative of the number of roles that they had proved themselves capable of fulfilling. |
| Addendum: Distribution of Christmas food parcels. |
At the same time, the opportunity was taken to distribute
Christmas food parcels to the village's 150 families, as
well as handing out sweets and drinks to the village
children. It turned out, however, that Binh Ba's population
had been swollen prior to Christmas by the influx of an
additional 46 families. Captain Joffre Gilchrist, OC Forward
Delivery Troop, told the villagers that the new arrivals
would get food parcels too. True to his word, the necessary
'goodies' were gathered together, and the extra food parcels
distributed on 27 December 1969. (Thirty 44 gallon drums
were also handed over to help the village with its water
storage.)
|
| Topic: Artillery support | One such case was that of Corporal 'Bluey' Lowe on the night of 28/29 May 1968 at FSB Balmoral. His elevated position in the turret afforded him an ideal location from which to adjust artillery counter bombardment fire against an enemy mortar position. Two days earlier, 102 Battery fired in support of a bunker contact involving 1 Troop and C Company 1RAR. On return to FSB Coral, Lieutenant Gerry McCormack made a point of personally thanking each of the gun sergeants. Although not having to call in fire missions themselves very often, it is fair to say that tank commanders were very appreciative of artillery's responsiveness, accuracy, and effectiveness. |
| Long Hai Patrol : Targeting the Caves |
Operations TANGLE (Tango
Force VIII) and CUTLASS (landclearing) both concluded on 24
December 1969, allowing 2 and 3 Troops to return to Nui Dat.
Clark, now promoted to sergeant to replace de Turt (3 Troop)
who had been seconded as liaison officer with 8RAR, recalls
going to a church service on Christmas Eve:
"...we went over
to Task Force about midnight and joined in with about 150
other lost souls. The two things I remember about that
service was a fellow loudly complaining that he had not got
his glass of wine, and secondly, when the offering was
requested, everyone throwing money out in front of the
pulpit. Not exactly St Paul's Cathedral stuff, but I'm sure
everyone there was blessed anyway."
|
| Operation LEOPARD : Tango Force X | Toll set off as soon as 'marrying up' was completed. The cordon was be inserted the following day; until then, the orders were to patrol the AO. Before long, they were entering an area in which they had operated frequently as part of previous Tango Force deployments. Their renewed presence was unlikely to raise any particular alarm. Just past Binh Ba the armoured vehicles headed west from Route 2 and travelled parallel with the northern boundary of the rubber plantation. It was quickly apparent that the enemy had put the Christmas ceasefire to good use. At 0945hrs, callsign 1Charlie (Corporal Auric Tomlinson) hit a large mine. The force of the explosion resulted in Trooper Ross Evans, the gunner, suffering a a lacerated scalp and fractured left ankle. |
| The 'New' Squadron Continues On | It was a fact of life accepted by tank crews...wherever you were, you had to be ready to react to a range of different contingencies at a moment's notice. So it was for 3 Troop late in the afternoon of 29 December 1969. It had happened before and would happen many times again---just when everyone is starting to think about returning to the FSB and getting set up for the night, the Troop Leader receives a radio message, issues brief orders and the Troop deploys in the oppposite direction. This time a helicopter pilot had reported sighting two platoons of VC in the vicinity of a track about 4km to the south of FSB Peggy. 3 Troop had been on a reconnaisssance--in--force to the east, not far from Ap Ngai Giao, and were tasked to investigate. The tanks would have to move quickly if they were to reach the area and conduct any sort of a search before last light. |
| Mobile Pillboxes | As mentioned previously, great care must be taken in drawing lessons from such employment of AFVs. Whether a single tank acted as a deterrent, or the enemy had other priorities, will never be known. What is known, is that the enemy had previously shown their preparedness to seize the initiative by engaging tanks---even when they had been operating together as a troop. Such was the case on 4 January 1970. |
| Operation MATILDA : Armour in its Element | On Australia Day 1970, Matilda Force were directed to return to Nui Dat. The Operation had demonstrated just how well an independent armoured force could operate over large distances, despite the terrain. The successes of Tango Forces had been replicated on a much larger scale. Without doubt, time spent in preparation beforehand, paid off handsomely during the course of the Operation itself. As Chipman concluded in the After Action Report: 'The ability to move long distances in the time frame given, with a minimum of administrative problems, indicates the high standard of co-operation and joint planning achieved'. Within a month, the highest possible standards would again be clearly evident---this time, however, they would be those of bravery and self-sacrifice. |
| Topic: Ordnance supply |
After only 10 months
in-country, the operational capability of the Tank Squadron
was in jeopardy. The following priority message, sent from
1ATF to HQ AFV on 1 December 1968, explains the situation:
"Subject: Idler Wheel. There are nil stocks in theatre. If an idler wheel breaks on the next operation, a serious operational problem will occur. Understand a quantity are on priority one service demand ex NZ and UK. Appreciate all possible hastening action be taken." |
| Ready to Go at All Times |
2 Troop, on return from land
clearing, became the Ready Reaction Troop. They were still
fulfilling this role when their new Troop Leader, Lieutenant
'Jack' Brennan, flew into Luscombe Field on 29 January
(replacing Ritchie who had departed the previous day).
Accompanied by Second Lieutenant Graeme Jones, the new 3
Troop Leader (vice McNeilage), Brennan was not as lucky as
Cumper had been in terms of settling-in:
"We were met by the
Squadron Commander, Jack Chipman....and hopped onto his
'carrier'. As we were driving back to the Squadron lines,
the Troop to which I was being posted, 2 Troop, were
'reacted'. So, still in civilian clothes [as required for
the transit through Singapore] I was thrown onto the top of
my new tank; no equipment, no weapon or anything else, other
than what was on the tank. We didn't end up in a fire fight,
or anything like that...but it was certainly a shock to the
system."
|
| A Trial Run |
The enemy were occupying a
bunker system about 7km west of Xuyen Moc and 4 Troop (Cumper),
located at the Horseshoe at the time, were reacted to
assist. The A Squadron Commander's Diary records that:
"Tanks assaulted
position with infantry; evacuated infantry casualties and
formed LZ for casevac aircraft. During assault one tank
bellied on tree. No casualties or damage to tanks. Tanks
remained with infantry for security during the night."
|
|
Operation HAMMERSLEY :
The Call Comes |
In such circumstances, the operator has an unevitable job: replenishing 20 pounder rounds from the under floor bins. The race to get the rounds out, with minimal interruption to the turret traverse, whilst targets are being engaged, can be quite frantic. So it was that the operator on Brennan's tank, Trooper Graeme Footer, became jammed between the turret basket and the hull wall when the turret was suddenly traversed. Whilst Corporal Ted Beazley was coming in to replace Footer next morning, battlefield 'statistics' were being collected: 11 enemy bodies remained, whilst drag marks numbered around 22. Five members of 9 Platoon had been wounded during the contact, as had one of the sappers from the Platoon's 'splinter' team. |
|
Operation HAMMERSLEY :
Minh Dam Secret No More |
At around 0750hrs, as 1 Troop were deploying along the
fire trail, the lead tank, callsign 1Charlie (Corporal
'Pedro' Rosemond), struck an anti-tank mine. Amounting to
about 13.5kg (30lb) of explosive, the mine was offset and
detonated under the centre of the vehicle. As a result, when
the hull 'dished' upwards, it caused: 'the ammunition in the
floor bins to rupture and the Rotary Base Junction (RBJ) to
short circuit'. When callsign 3Alpha hit a mine two months
earlier and a fire broke out, the effects were confined to
the engine compartment. This time, however, callsign
1Charlie was not reversing.
Operation HAMMERSLEY had major implications for the enemy over and above their material losses (casualties, captured weapons, destroyed bunkers and the like). In particular, the image that they had long promoted of their sanctuary in the Long Hais being immune against attack, had been destroyed. Both the ARVN and the local population had been shown that there was no such thing as a safe haven for the VC. It was important now that the Vietnamese Forces build on the success and prevent the enemy re-establishing themselves. |
|
Topic: Milo Bill |
There was another side to the work of the Salvation
Army representatives that many of those in the Tank
Squadrons, and other units, came to appreciate. Numerous
friends and relatives at home would have known of their
presence because of the letters received written on
Salvation Army stationary: 'If you are surprised at the
paper, I will let you into a secret. It is given to us for
free, all we have to do is ask'. More importantly than this,
however, was the personal help that was readily offered
whenever needed. This could manifest itself in a thousand
ways. The following extract from a letter home, is but one
example:
Have reapplied for the allotment
and till it comes through, shall send money by telegram.
Since we are away from Nui Dat and will be for four weeks
yet, it is difficult to arrange this, but the Salvation Army
chap is helping me a little.
|
| Radio Intercept : D445 One Jump Ahead |
The main reason that D445
evaded the net once again was undoubtedly the fact that the
location provided by the agent was around 2000m north of the
actual position. Nevertheless, it is useful here to consider
information about D445 which became available some 12 months
later. The 1ATF Liasion Officer at Xuyen Moc provided the
following report on his discussions with the District
'Deputy for Security':
He suggests that radio frequencies should be changed daily when operating against D445. He says D445 have good interpreters and they learn the frequencies fairly rapidly; he says that they have many 25 Sets and soon learn our frequencies by systematic searching---I asked him how he knew this and he said 'from agents'. Also included in this report was the statement that: '...the VC, especially D445, know the capabilities and limitations of APCs and tanks and they move to areas most likely to inhibit these vehicles after contacts'. Acknowledging skills such as these, helps in understanding the constant pressure felt by all AFV crews; the struggle to stay one step ahead of the enemy. Every day was a battle of wits. |
| Reacting On Time, Every Time---Not Without Cost |
17 March 1970 was a day to
remember as far as 3 Troop (Jones) were concerned. Following
Operation HAMMERSLEY, Chipman commented in his report to the
Director of Armour (Colonel D R Kepper) at Army Headquarters
in Canberra: 'I hope [this] gives an idea of the strain the
tank crews have been under---the tanks have reacted on time,
every time, and I have to give both men and machines a
break...'. The time had now come for 3 Troop to have a
spell. Apart from one day in transit between 6RAR/NZ and
8RAR, 3 Troop had been in the field since 5 February 1970
(the start of 'Tet'). The continual effort involved in
keeping the almost 20 year old vehicles operational, is
illustrated by the work required by the Centurion ARV
attached to 3 Troop:
The time out at FSB
Discovery was quite busy as one day, I forget which, we did
a clutch oil seal...and had to replace the clutch. On the
way back [from an ambush with 3 Troop] the main engine
started to make some funny noises. On checking, we found
that the big ends were knocking, so the 'boss' decided that
we should put in a new main engine at the FSB'.
|
| Easter 1970 : Mines Continue to take Their Toll |
The first casualty from enemy action experienced by
1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC (Sergeant Jock McConnell, 6
April 1968) had been caused by an M16 which had been run
over by the tank next to him. In the case of Corporal 'Tiny'
O'Shea and Trooper John Capuano, however, they were on the
tank which ran over the mine:
"We were coming out of a night
ambush...I was the lead tank. We went through a lot of soft
ground [and] the driver went right down to second gear. As I
stood up [to see what the problem was] the mine went off...I
was looking back, looking over my right hand shoulder."
|
| Manning : The Ultimate Staff Responsibility |
Chipman continued on in his letter to the
Director of Armour (check) to say that: '...now that
Corporal Key's extension has been approved, we are ok for
corporals'. On the other hand: 'Drivers are our biggest
problem and I may have to hold people back if the immediate
problems can't be overcome'.
As Meredith's posting affected Prickett, so Lowes's
appointment as Squadron Liaison Officer at Duc Thanh,
affected Corporal 'Tubby' Brooker. In theory, the Tank
Squadron and Forward Delivery Troop were separate units.
Lowes's departure, however, saw Brooker moving from his
position as Troop Corporal, Forward Delivery Troop, to take
over one of the Special Equipment Troop tank dozers (callsign
92Alpha, ARN 169071).
|
| Close Support : In More Ways Than One |
'We
leave here at 8am tomorrow morning to go out to a Fire
Support Base called BOND. It is a brand new base. The next
week will be very interesting as the whole of the
Australian Task Force is to be out on one big operation. The
idea is to push the VC into one central area and finish him
off.' Graeme Unmack, Vehicle Mechanic (RAEME), Nui Dat, 19
April 1970.
Operation CONCRETE called for a major effort from the tank squadron. SHQ and 3 Troop deployed to FSB Bond (south of Xuyen Moc); 1 Troop were already located at FSB Elaine (east of Xuyen Moc); and 2 Troop, at the Horseshoe, were on call. Other, on-going commitments, involved 4 Troop at FSB Le Loi, supporting road construction on Route 2; as well as and SHQ tanks at Night Defensive Position (NDP) Timothy, helping to protect the engineers clearing the Barrier Minefield near Ap Lo Gom. |
|
Coping with the Unforeseen |
Even with
the light from the tank, however, [Lieutenant Robin] Pothof
could not be found. Only when a Sioux helicopter arrived and
illuminated the scene from above, was his body able to be
seen...about 20m into the minefield. The mini-team cleared a
path and made the surrounding ground safe. [Corporal Bob]
Roberts and his gunner, Trooper Alex Polotnianka, then recovered
the Officer's body, placing it on the back of their tank. The
next morning, Absalom went out in ZeroDelta to collect the
ambush party. When they got back, Roberts recalls '...the looks
on their faces said it all, as they, in small groups, came over
over to my tank and paid their last respects to their Platoon
Commander'.
|
|
Time For a New Strategy |
The way the Task Force
Commander developed his Concept of Operations was not
something that those involved in greasing final drives or
cleaning 20 pounder rounds in floor bins, often reflected
upon. It was equally important, however, that the tasks be
got right at both levels.
Despite their own
preoccupations, tank crews would have been aware that the
emphasis of the Task Force's operations started to change
towards the end of April 1970. The concentration of effort
on D445 Mobile Force battalion during the previous three
months, had paid dividends. The local force VC unit had been
weakened and now it was time to focus on the nexus between
the VC and and the village cadres. As if to underscore the
challenges involved, at 2025hrs on 29 April 1970, 2 Troop
'sighted [a] light from Long Hais being signalled and
answered by light in Ho My village [3-4km away]'. The
Commander's Diary goes on to record that the area was
'engaged with three rounds and light extinguished'.
|
|
Topic: Spares parts availability |
"Yesterday one of our tanks developed engine trouble. It was 'missing' and had no power. So this morning we checked the plugs and they were in a shocking state. They have only been in for about two weeks and 100 miles [160km]. The trouble is that the main engine is worn out. It has done close to 1000 miles [1600km], so we really can't blame it. But the big problem is [that] we can't send it in for an engine change as there are no main engines left in-country and there is a waiting list of six tanks for main engine changes. So we have to keep putting in plugs and keep it running as best we could." |
| Despite the Mines, the Jobs Get Done |
Admin Troop were always as susceptible to
enemy action as everyone else. On 5 May 1970, the: 'relief
vehicle moving to the mine clearing team located road blocks
made of wire strung across the road'. The 'blocks were
pulled with no result', however, the incident emphasised the
need for constant alertness by everyone. 3 Troop returned to
FSB Discovery from the Horseshoe on 6 May 1970. They were
immediately committed to a reconnaissance--in--force and at
1600hrs they located and destroyed two bunkers about 5km to
the north east. The bunkers had been used within the last
few weeks and the Troop decided to remain in the same area
that night. The care with which they selected and occupied
the position paid off. At 0145hrs a small group of VC
experienced what must be close to being an insurgent's worse
nightmare---walking into an ambush initiated by tanks firing
canister. Sounds of movement were heard again much later and
it seems that the enemy may have returned to remove bodies
(displaying immense bravery in doing so). Two clear sets of
drag marks were found during a sweep next morning.
|
|
Team Efforts Make a Difference (Once Again) |
" 'Jonesy'
was laying down heaps of fire and constantly calling for
more ammo. All available canister was used up (about 25
rounds), plus several HE and a couple of APCBC. The .30cal
coaxial machine gun became so hot, that the barrel was white
and transparent and I could see the shadows of projectiles
going down the barrel. With all the guns blazing away for so
long, it was unbelievably hot in the fighting compartment
and my clothes were soaked in sweat. At times the 'boss' had
to lay the main armament for our gunner. We were so close
to the bunkers, John couldn't see them through his sight."
|
|
Intense Action One Day : Routine the Next |
In the
days immediately after 21 May 1970, the land clearing team
left the Horseshoe at about 0730hrs each morning. They
headed for the bunker system which 3 Troop had attacked and
proceeded to clear the area around it. Not only had the
bunkers been destroyed, but there would no longer be any
cover to enable the position to be redeveloped. 3 Troop
provided the protection for the D8s. Other Troops continued
much as before: 1 Troop (Prickett) at NDP Elizabeth
protecting road construction on Route 2, and 2 Troop
(Brennan) at NDP Brigid protecting mine clearing operations.
The outgoing Task Force Commander would have been pleased
with the operational situation he was handing over: 'By the
25th May a calm had settled over the southern area of Phuoc
Tuy, attributable largely to the tight 8 RAR and 7RAR
control of the Vietcong access routes to the population
centres'.
|
| Topic: Squadron artists | Official war artists are rightfully famous for their efforts in recording graphic images of Australians at war. No less important to soldiers themselves, however, are those amongst their own who can design a troop emblem, or decorate the walls of the unit 'boozer'. Each troop within the tank squadron in Vietnam had its own identifying sign. Displayed prominantly adjacent to respective troop lines at Nui Dat, the designs were often reproduced as cloth badges and worn by crewmen on their 'flying suits' when off-duty. In a number of cases, the emblems were painted on the tanks themselves. Positions varied from the side of the turret, to the turret bins, to the back of the 100 gallon fuel tank. |
| Both Tanks and Dozers in the Clag | Lasting from May to October, the 'Wet' changes the landscape dramatically: 'the rice paddies are mostly under water and ready for planting...in fact, quite a lot of them have already been planted'. The challenge for the Tank Squadron was not to allow the conditions to impede operational capability. Everyone was aware that the enemy had previously sought to use these months to their advantage: Coral/Balmoral, late May '68; Binh Ba, early June '69. There were also suggestions that the enemy force engaged on 21 May 1970, had intended to establish a large ambush Route 2. Added to all this was the fact that elections were to be conducted throughout SVN at the end of June. It was important, therefore, that 1ATF continue to be active, whilst maintaining the capability to respond quickly to intelligence reports (sources for which included a number of SAS reconnaissance patrols). |
| Mine Warfare Reaches a New Level |
About the
same time, Wicks dropped his Zippo cigarette lighter and the
operator, Trooper Max Hyson, was told to retrieve it from
the turret floor. Just at that moment, there was: 'a loud
thump, followed by flames'. The fact that Hyson was looking
towards the rear of the turret, was: 'the only thing that
saved [his] face from burns'. 'All the floor bins and
portion of the twenty round bin spontaneously caught fire
from the initial explosion'.
Hyson recalls that training took over from that point: 'check that Geoff [Geoff Jewell, the driver] was ok, pull the CO2s [driver], shut the hatches, and climb down the rear of a fairly angry Centurion'. Trooper Chris Large, operator on Cumper's tank immediately behind, saw Martlew and Wicks hit the ground to the side of their tank and immediately yelled out: 'Mines!'; whereupon they: 'jumped back onto the tracks and ran to the following tank'. Whilst they were watching their tank (ARN 169067) being engulfed by fire, interspersed with exploding ammunition, the crew of 4Alpha had little idea that they had experienced the 'first reported use of RPG projectiles as mines'. It was not until around 1400hrs that re-entry to the tank became possible. |
| Bunker Busting Again |
When the Hoi Chanh thought they were close to the right
location, the tanks took over the lead, supported by two
platoons of infantry behind and to the flanks.
Unfortunately, the thickness of the jungle made it very
difficult for the tanks to maintain direction. Support
Section with the Hoi Chanh came forward again; however, just
after moving off, they came under heavy fire. 8RAR's Vietnam
history records that:
"On the 8th [of July], C
Company, when moving forward with the Hoi Chanh to locate
the hospital, contacted an unknown number of enemy in
bunkers and were eventually relieved by 1 Troop of the
Armoured Squadron who restored the situation after the
Support Section had been pinned down by heavy fire."
|
| The Ground Opens Up Once More |
At
1835hrs on 28 July, callsign 1 (Prickett) hit an M16 mine.
Just north of Lo Gom and so close to the Barrier minefield,
this was always a possibility. Unfortunately, on this
occasion, the operator, Trooper 'Mick' Charenko, received
fragmentation wounds to his back. Whilst he remained on duty
(returning to Nui Dat later for medical treatment), the
Commander's Diary suggests that the crew commander was very
lucky not to have also received shrapnel wounds: 'No damage
to vehicle, although external stowage on rear of tank
received general shrapnel damage'. The incident must have
been something of a distraction...the next day callsign 1
became bogged in similar conditions to those which had
trapped 3 Troop the month before. The ARV was not on hand at
the time, but was quickly dispatched:
"It [callsign 1] was down at the back and the rear fuel tank was about 9 inches [22cm] below ground level. The ground had collapsed below the surface and down the tank went. We had to use a 3 to 1 layout on the winch to get him out and that took a 85 ton pull to move it." |
| Topic: Aviation support | Aircraft, particularly helicopters, meant everything to tank crews. Slung loads which were brought in on an almost daily basis, included ammunition and spare parts (Iroquois) and fuel (Chinooks). Iroquois, both RAAF and US, also 'dusted off' casualties and provided gunship support. US Cobra gunships flew missions in close support of some tank troops, while other crews witnessed the might of B52 Stratofortress, F4 Phantom, F100 Super Sabre and Canberra strikes. Even more spectacular for those involved, was the firepower of 'Spooky', a Douglas C47 fitted with mini-guns. Despite all this, one of the most remembered experiences was that frequently provided by 'Wallaby Airlines'---the short flight between Tan Son Nhut Airport (Saigon) and Luscombe Field (Nui Dat). Whether it be the feeling of apprehension on arrival, or relief on departure, the ride on one of the Caribous operated by 35 Squadron RAAF, remains a clear memory for many. |
| Pull Back or Press Home the Advantage? | Reports about the effect that 1ATF operations were having on the enemy's food supplies had been coming in since around June 1970. As a result of continuing shortages, morale within VC units at the start of August was low, and it was to get worse as the month progressed. There was frustration, for example, experienced by one group of insurgents on 1 August. At 0205hrs, whilst protecting the damaged US 'Duster', 4 Troop (Goldman) glimpsed a light. Working on the assumption that a mine laying party might have been busy, the area was investigated by the Troop's mini-team next morning. The alertness of the sentry and diligence of the sappers paid off....at 1030hrs, a mine was found. The next day, 4 Troop provided an escort as the 'Duster' was recovered to Route 15. Unbeknown to anyone at the time, the enemy minelaying team(s) had been thwarted again. On 3 August, a 2RAR/NZ patrol found three more anti-tank mines on the firetrail used during the recovery. |
| Operation MASSEY HARRIS : The Bridge Proves its Worth (Again) | It was important that the incident not be allowed to disrupt the Operation. As soon as the immediate area had been checked for mines and the final 'dustoff' had departed, Massey Force completed the crossing and proceeded to establish NDP Beverley, about 2km from the crossing. It was not until 1845hrs that they arrived, however, as no alternative crossing point could be found and considerable engineering effort was required to enable the tank bridge to be laid. The remains of the previous bridge had to be precisely demolished---91 explosive charges being required. An even greater challenge lay to the east of the NDP. The Song Chua, 2.5km further on, was a deep, fast flowing, river. The bridge over it had also been destroyed and a reconnaissance revealed that demolition of the ruins would be a major task; in addition to which, the approaches would require dozing to allow the bridge to be laid. |
| Sustaining the Commitment and Enthusiasm |
It was left to 1 and 2 Troops to provide infantry support throughout September. 1 Troop were based initially at the Horseshoe, ready to provide support for 7RAR's operations in AO Carmen to the east of the Province. The first request came on 2 September, crews deploying some 25km to an area south of Thua Tich to 'marry up' with B Company 7RAR. A visual reconnaisance by air a few days before had identified heavy tracks, suggesting that D445 had moved back into that part of the Province. Three days patrolling in the area failed to pin them down, however, and 1 Troop set off to return to the Horseshoe on 5 September. They were a little over half way back when disaster very nearly befell them. On Route 23, near where it crosses the Song Rai, there are five bridges within a two kilometre stretch; one over the main river itself, plus four smaller ones over tributaries. 1 Troop had successfully crossed over Song Rai, when: 'vehicles collapsed [the next] bridge, isolating the Troop with two vehicles either side of the crossing'. |
Chapter 23 A Two Battalion Task Force (Again) (6400 words)
|
Topic: SHQ Troop |
'Sabre troops (and attached LAD crews) would often bemoan, with more than a little justification, the constant periods of being 'on-call', frequent short notice tasks, and numerous changes of plans. There were others within the tank squadron, however, who were similarly affected...particularly Admin Troop's truck drivers and SHQ Troop's 'carrier' crews.' |
|
Maintaining Operational Effectiveness |
'If the tanks were to be ready for any resurgence of enemy activity, it could well be the 'Bluebells' who would hold the key: 'Over here things are rather busy. We have two troops [1 and 4] sitting in the LAD awaiting work to be done on them'. The weather, at least, offered a sense of hope: 'the sun is out for most of the day now, so it is gradually drying the place out'. |
|
30 Minutes Notice to Move Put to the Test |
'There is another element to this ready reaction force commitment. The VC had been known to initiate attacks against relatively 'soft' targets like RF posts, to lure rescue forces into ambushes. The likelihood of such a possibility was increased if there was only one route available to reach the site of the 'attack'. An ambush of this type could involve mines placed both in the centre and on the verges of the road, as well as carefully sited RPG teams. Mortars might also be set up, their distance from the ambush having been accurately paced out. The enemy attack on the night of 29 November could well have been such a ruse. What did that mean for those in the AFVs involved? |
|
The Baton is Passed for the Last Time |
'There
seemed to be something of a contradiction in terms of enemy
assessments at this time. Making sense of this has always been, and
will remain, the challenge for intelligence analysts. For example,
while 3 Battalion 274 VC Regiment were reported as having 'to rely
on jungle foraging for survival', 3 Battalion 33 NVA Regiment were
reported to have moved into an area not far from the Courtney Rubber
Plantation, with 'new green uniforms and fresh haircuts'. Time would
tell what this evolving situation would mean for 1ATF.'
|
|
Topic: The Search for Good Intelligence.
|
1 ATF
operations constantly contributed to the intelligence picture.
While long range SAS patrols were an example of targeted
information gathering (reconnaissance), every soldier, whether
on foot, in a vehicle or aboard an aircraft, had the potential
to discover something previously unknown about the enemy, or
confirm something that was suspected. Other sources of such
information included: captured documents; prisoner
interrogation; Chieu Hois statements; and radio intercepts and
direction finding. On-going assessments of enemy strength and
intentions were supplemented by 'agent' reports and intelligence
from allied operations. Finally, aerial surveillance involving
the detection of infrared and ammonia emissions ('red haze' and
'people sniffer' flights) also contributed timely data.
|
|
How Would the Enemy Respond to the Withdrawal?
|
The enemy's
immediate intentions were far from clear. Reports of harassing
activity in the north of the Province continued to be received.
These included the engineer M48 mine clearer striking a mine on
Route 2, about 1500m south of Courtenay Hill, on 18 December
1970. The explosion damaged the roller mechanism and this had to
be replaced. Ominously, although at 4.5kg (10lbs) it was
relatively small, the mine incorporated an RPG warhead! The
following day, Route 2 was mined again in the same location.
This time the mine was seen and a mini-team made it safe. The
enemy were more successful on 22 December...two mines were
detonated. Although the mine clearer found one of them, the
other damaged an APC.
|
| Christmas 1970. |
While
Christmas Day passed without violation of the truce, would the
same apply to New Year celebrations, or would the enemy see this
as an opportunity to strike? Somewhat surprisingly, Province
officials informed 1ATF that the VC had announced that they
would observe a cease fire (thought to be from 31 December 1970
to 3 January 1971), to mark the calendar New Year. Undoubtedly
the enemy would seek to gain advantage from such a proposal,
could it be that they intended to redeploy within Phuoc Tuy at
this time?
|
| What Would the New Year Herald? |
As New Year's
Eve approached, it is likely that there were at least few at Nui
Dat and elsewhere within Phuoc Tuy who wondered how vulnerable
1ATF might become as the New Year progressed. If they knew how
advanced the enemy's planning was...they may have been even more
concerned. Documents found in packs after the 30/31 December
ambush indicated that the enemy's priority was to minimise the
effectiveness of Allied pacification efforts, thereby making it
that much easier for them to assume control after the
withdrawal. Amongst other things, VC commanders in Phuoc Tuy
were required to: recruit additional agents; disrupt
administrative control by the Government; recruit sizeable
numbers of youths; develop political organisations; increase the
number of unexploded shells retrieved by both VC soldiers and
civilians; employ engineers to attack installations, including
storage facilities; and lead guerillas in ambushes, mine
attacks, and anti-aircraft and anti-tank activities.
|
|
Facilitating Pacification.
|
Whether at
the Horseshoe, NDP Lorraine, or ambushing, no-one could afford
to relax when on picquet. Whoever it was from 2 Troop who
noticed what appeared to be a light some 5500m away up on the
Nui Dinhs on 2 January, was certainly alert. It was around
0330hrs and the Troop were in an ambush position to the west of
Hoa Long. Task Force Headquarters immediately radioed elements
of C Company 2RAR/NZ, located in the vicinity, to ask if they
could see anything. Using a 'starlight scope', the infantry
confirmed the presence of a light, adding that it appeared to be
coming from within a cave. The Commander's Diary recorded that
'2 Troop engaged and the light was extinguished'. The 'reward'
(was there a bet involved?) came a few of days later when the
Troop were lucky enough to get away on a rare R&C trip to Vung
Tau.
|
|
3 Cav in the Thick of Things.
|
The enemy
responded quickly to try and reassert their authority. On 17
January, Captain R K Hill, MC, 2IC B Squadron 3 Cav, led a
section of APCs to the far north east of the Province to insert
an SAS patrol. On Route 329, around 15km past Xuyen Moc,
callsign 33Alpha struck a large offset mine. The explosion
occurred beneath the driver and buckled the hull badly in that
area. Despite almost being blown off by the force of the blast,
the belly armour served its purpose and minimised penetration
into the vehicle. Although this greatly reduced the severity of
wounds to those aboard the APC, both the crew commander,
Corporal Brien Plunkett and driver, Trooper Jeff Townsend,
needed to be 'dusted off'.
|
|
...and Still More Mines.
|
Australia day 1971 was also the start of 'Tet'. As part of an agreed 'ceasefire', no offensive operations were conducted by 1ATF from 1600hrs 26 January to 1800hrs 27 January. 3 Troop, on Ready Reaction Force stand-by during this period, were relieved not to be called out. Their next task would not have been much of a consolation... escorting a convoy of personnel and stores needed for the establishment of Fire Support Base Lynx, 7km south of the May Taos. Not only were D445 known to be infiltrating into Phuoc Tuy from their sanctuary in the Mao Taos, but just two weeks before the single access road into the area had been mined. 3 Troop, together with a bridgelayer, tank dozer and ARV, set off on the 50km trip on 30 January. |
|
The First Casualties for 1971.
|
Before refuelling could commence, the Barnes pump (carried on Sergeant Phil Reeve's tank) had to be put on the truck and connected to one of the bladders. This was done and the tanks were backed into position ready for refuelling. Craftsman Bob Kofoed came forward to get the pump going after difficulty was experienced starting it. Once done, there was another problem...no petrol was being pumped through. The hose was swapped with another from one of Sergeant Bob Hunter's carriers (83 Section). This seemed to work, until petrol suddenly started to spray from the hose coupling. |
Chapter 25 : Staying Focussed : Despite the Uncertainty (6100 words)
|
Topic: The Passage of Information
|
Major
Bourke, as did the Squadron Commanders before him, made regular
visits to tank troops deployed on operations. These were
designed to keep Squadron Headquarters abreast of conditions in
the field, as well as informing troop personnel of matters
relevant to them. He could only pass on what he knew, however.
In 1967, C Squadron had to overcome
enormous difficulties created by the totally inadequate warning
given for the deployment of a tank squadron to Vietnam. Would
similar restrictions on the passage of information, hamper the
withdrawal of the tank squadron four years later?
|
|
The Political Element in Decision Making
|
At Task
Force Headquarters and higher, however, there was a lot going
on. Brigadier Henderson's advice about the best time to withdraw
the tanks had been sought the month before by COMAFV (Major
General Colin Fraser, CBE). Henderson replied:
" In my view[,] the one argument
for the withdrawal of the Centurions is the administrative
burden of keeping them on the road. The [operational]
requirement for their retention in theatre at this stage[,] far
outweighs the administrative argument. As you recall[,] I
deployed this asset throughout the Province in the last wet. Op
MASSEY-HARRIS was a splendid example of their value."
|
| Cat and Mouse Continues |
Something which remains in the Troop Leader's memory was that:
'There were rubber workers in the area and I recall myself and
others in the Troop commenting to each other over the [radio]
net that we were probably in for trouble because they were all
ignoring us'. A few minutes later, an explosion shook callsign
1Alpha. Sergeant Nev Calliss's first thought was that he had hit
a mine. He was wrong:
"The landrovers of the [131
Divisional Locating Battery] Survey Section were immediately
behind the three Centurion tanks that were escorting the convoy.
The driver of the first survey vehicle followed the tank tracks
as best he could. He had his driver side wheels in the right
hand track marks of the tanks. As they approached a corner of
the road the passenger side wheel ran over a mine."
|
|
Protecting
the Dozers (Again)
|
Regular flooding during the Wet seasons meant that the
minefields were very boggy. One dozer became stuck so badly,
that it took two tanks to tow it out. (A reversal of the
more frequent role of engineer dozers in the SWPA during the
Second World War.)
Another incident occurred at NDP
Dani during February...a member of A Squadron 3 Cav shot
himself when his pistol accidently discharged while he was
reassembling it after cleaning. Co-incidently, the following
day a member of 2RAR/NZ (on operations elsewhere) also shot
himself with his pistol. If these 'own goals' were not
enough, the week before, a member of 1 Field Squadron had
shot another member of his unit when his weapon (believed to
be a pistol) accidently discharged.
|
|
Out
Patrolling, Rather than Static Defence
|
Sometimes tank troops would patrol by themselves; on other
occasions, they would be part of combat arms teams. The
latter was the case on 11 February 1971. 4 Troop (Goldman)
departed the Horseshoe, accompanied by a section of APCs and
an infantry platoon (from A Company 7RAR). Their task, to
conduct a sweep in the vicinity of the Light Green. There
was obviously some intelligence to hand, as the Troop spent
the next ten days patrolling the area, returning each night
to Fire Support Base Brigid.
As had been shown to be the case
many times previously, if AFV crews are well trained and
alert, they can detect signs on the ground which warrant
closer examination. So it was that a grave was located in
the Light Green, to the east of Hoi My. A quantity of
webbing, eleven fully loaded rifle (M16) magazines, clothing
and other items were found nearby---more intelligence for
Task Force Headquarters.
|
|
3RAR
Replaces 7RAR
|
Possibly due to the success of the enemy's mining campaign,
Fire Support Base Bass was closed on 23 February. 1 Troop (Prickett)
relocated to a new fire support base, Lindy, about 7km to
the south west, just off Route 2. 2RAR/NZ operations in the
north of the Province would now be supported from there. Two
days later, while patrolling the surrounding area, 1 Troop
came across five fighting pits. Examination by the mini-team
revealed a 100ft (30m) tunnel containing three rooms. Three
rifles and a bandolier of M79 rounds were also discovered.
The system, thought to be about 12 months old, was collapsed
by the tanks.
The enemy's more immediate presence was being felt in the south of the Province at this time. 161 Recce Flight were involved in two incidents. On 24 February, a Sioux helicopter received ground fire while flying in the vicinity of the Long Hais; while the following day the pilot of another Sioux, doing the early morning route clearance, came across a body on Route 23, just 3km east of Dat Do. |
|
'In-Country'
Infantry--Tank Training
|
3RAR deployed on 28 February in readiness for 'in-country' training; that with tanks and APCs being scheduled to take place in an area about 6km east of Nui Dat. 5 Troop married up with B Company (Major Ivan Cahill) at about 0900hrs the following day. Unfortunately the location of the RV required the tanks to push through thick bamboo to get there...a lesson in terms of tankcraft before the training even started. During the day the tanks practised movement and contact drills with each platoon. The infantry were bouyed by the fact that D Company (Major Sticpewich) had earlier contacted a small party of enemy about 5km to the north west. The tanks occupied a harbour with B Company that night, moving back to the RV to marry up with C Company (Major Peter Tilley) on 2 March. |
|
The Enemy
Seizes the Opportunity
|
It was
about 0300hrs when those at Nui Dat stood down: 'TF [Task Force]
must have thought that there were a lot of VC out there'. While
the only thing picked up by the C Company clearing patrol next
morning, was a sandal, a trail was found 'which had been used by
at least 12 people that night and where someone had snuck
forward [close to the tanks]'. If they had hoped for an easy
target for a satchel charge, they were mistaken.
Even before the the canister was fired, the enemy were probably in little doubt as to where the tanks were located. Both company positions had been probed earlier in the night and it might be expected that the main attack would be directed at D Company. The experience of those involved in the SWPA during the Second World War supported this: '…if the Jap knew that tanks were within an infantry perimeter, he seldom mounted an attack. This factor alone always made the tanks welcome to the infanteer'. |
Chapter 26 : D445 Re-enters the Fray (7150 words)
|
Topic : R&R
|
Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave was something everyone looked forward to. The scheme was operated under the auspices of the US Army, and enabled Australians to join charter flights to either Bangkok, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney; or Taipei. The relative popularity of destinations in 1969 was: Sydney (60%); Hong Kong (20%); Bangkok (9%); Taipei (9%) and Singapore (2%). In order to help defray costs, a fee was levied by the US on a per person basis; this varied with different destinations in accordance with differing landing and air navigation charges. |
| Mines Still the Weapon of Choice |
4 Troop led off from the
Horseshoe at 0700hrs the following morning. After travelling
about 16km along Route 23, the combat arms team turned south on
Route 328. The bridge over the Song Hoa, two kilometers further
on, was known to be destroyed. A way across had to be located as
the infiltration route likely to be used by the enemy, was on
the other side. It was not just a matter of the mini-team using
their mine detectors to clear the most suitable crossing. The
enemy knew that this would be done; their tactic, therefore, was
to lay mines in the immediate surrounds.
At 1034hrs, callsign
8Bravo detonated a 40lb (18kg) mine. It had been 'well buried
and had apparently been set for [a] tank'. The right front
suspension of the ARV took the brunt of the force. Craftsman
Peter Hunter, the driver, was thrown forward against the edge of
the glacis plate.
|
| The Operational Tempo Increases |
2 Troop
returned to Nui Dat for a short spell two days later. They were
replaced at Lindy by 3 Troop (Hind). Soon after, the quarry at
NDP Garth was closed. Reconstruction work on Route 2 had
progressed sufficiently for gravel to be supplied from Nui Dat.
Once the engineers had left, the site continued to be used as a
patrol base by Victor Company 2RAR/NZ. 3 Troop operated
throughout the area during March and located and destroyed a
number of enemy installations. These included bunkers with
overhead protection and systems incorporating tunnels.
As usual, tank troops were employed
on a variety of tasks. Prior to moving to Fire Support Base
Lindy, 3 Troop received orders to provide an escort for the
insertion of a five man SAS patrol whose mission was to gather
information on enemy in the vicinity of the Nui Thi Vais.
|
| Enemy Bunkers Prove Formidable Once Again |
The
3RAR Assault Pioneer Platoon (Lieutenant Peter Abigail) mounted
in the Troop Headquarters' APCs of 1 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav
(Captain Rod Earle) were reacted. They had about 14km to travel
from Fire Support Base Beth, 10km of which was along Route 328.
4 Troop, about 10km to the south east, were also reacted.
Unfortunately Route 329 would only get them half way there. Both
Goldman and Earle, approaching the contact from the east and
west respectively, were faced with the difficulty of maintaining
direction while simultaneously trying to move quickly and
negotiate dense vegetation. Guidance from the air could make a
difference and was worth trying.
Working from Sioux helicopters, Lieutenant Colonel Scout directed the tanks, Major Tony Williams, RAA, the APCs. With their much faster speed, the APCs reached the 8 Platoon patrol first; covering fire was provided and the casualties were able to be recovered by the infantry. Although badly wounded, Private Alan Gould was alive; Second Lieutenant Dave Patterson, however, was not. |
| High Mileages Take Their Toll |
The
remainder of March saw tank troop deployment remain much the
same: 1 Troop at NDP Rebecca, 2 Troop at Nui Dat on Ready
Reaction duties and ambushing Hoa Long; 3 Troop at Fire Support
Base Lindy and 4 and 5 Troops under operational control of 3RAR.
Demands on the vehicles had been heavy and mechanical failures
had to be expected. There was some consolation for 5 Troop on
the evening of 22 March. The final drive which failed on
callsign 5 did so just as the tank finished backing into its
night harbour position. If had failed five minutes earlier, the
vehicle would have had to be dragged back into position by
another tank, causing considerable disruption to the adjacent
infantry.
RAEME came to the rescue once again
the next day, replacing the final drive in situ. It had been
another long night for the crews, however. The sound of movement
outside the perimeter saw everyone 'stand to', a head count
conducted, and the area engaged with .30cal. When noise was
heard again later, canister was used. 'Stand down' was ordered
at midnight.
|
| Mining Campaign Continues |
So it
was that for the next few days, 4 Troop continued to ambush in
the north east of the AO (in the vicinity of Route 329) and 5
Troop in the south west (in the vicinity of the Horseshoe). The
enemy's mining campaign continued unabated during this period.
On 26 March, soon after turning off Route 23 onto Route 328 just
after 0900hrs, an APC struck a 40lb [18kg] mine. Although crew
wounds were relatively minor, damage to the vehicle was
significant. It was thought that the mine had been in place for
some time, but only armed the night before.
106 Field Workshop were tasked with
recovery. Having hooked up the casualty, the M543 Wrecker headed
back to Nui Dat along Route 23. At about 1330hrs, having
travelled about 3km from the location of the mine incident, a
small boy standing by the road flagged down the Wrecker and its
escort. Once the vehicles had stopped, he pointed a bit further
on...inspection revealed a 25lb [11kg] mine. Although the
explosive had been in place for some time, the bamboo switch had
only been inserted after the Wrecker had passed the spot a short
time before.
|
| Tanks Committed Piecemeal |
By
around 1630hrs, the Assault Pioneer Platoon had crossed the
river and were providing the support needed for 1 Platoon to
evacuate their casualties across the river to the APCs. Once
completed, the two platoons used fire and movement to follow.
There were eight casualties in all; seven from 1 Platoon, one of
whom later died of his wounds. Scott's Sioux was not the only
helicopter engaged by the enemy. A RAAF door gunner was killed
by ground fire during the Dustoff and two 9 Squadron gunships
were holed in several places.
All indications were that the bunker
system was a significant one; one which the enemy could well
defend aggressively. The close fire support of tanks could make
all the difference if they decided to stay and fight. The Task
Force Commander allocated Scott a second company from 2RAR/NZ (V
Company) to help close the cordon, while 4 Troop were positioned
to provide support for an assault.
|
| Withdrawal Intentions Slowly Take Shape |
The
other issue which needed to be addressed was the capability that
the Fire Support Vehicle (FSV) was to be called on to provide,
to compensate, in some part, for the loss of the tanks.
Henderson had previously referred to the FSV in terms of being
an "upgunned APC", warning of the danger of using it as a tank.
The description was accurate in many respects; the FSV
comprising the turret from a Saladin armoured car, mounted on an
M113A1 APC hull. While the turret provided much enhanced
firepower with a 76mm gun, the lightly armoured hull meant that
the vehicle could easily be 'knocked out' if used to attack an
enemy bunker position.
There seemed to be an element of
muddled thinking as far as the role of the vehicle was
concerned. Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam, informed AHQ
Canberra that:
"We appreciate that FSVs are not substitutes [for tanks], but we have always pressed the case with Defence that we must not be left without the means of dealing with bunkers, and the phasing out of the tanks is related to the arrival of the FSVs to this extent." |
Chapter 27 : The Withdrawal Gets Under Way (7250 words)
| Topic: Washing Program |
The
'Washing and Servicing Programme' was one of the things which
dictated timings. Not only was it important to have vehicles
which were serviceable and would not compound the difficulties
of loading and unloading ships, it was also necessary to ensure
that Australian Quarantine regulations were satisfied. To this
end, all traces of organic material had to be completely removed
from all equipment being returned to Australia.
Bourke described the standard as being one of 'clinical cleanliness'. To achieve this, the cleaning cycle took five days per tank at Nui Dat...further cleaning was conducted by 2 Advanced Ordnance Depot (2AOD) teams when the vehicles reached Vung Tau. |
| The Withdrawal Plan |
Deciding the order in which individual tanks would be pulled out
was relatively straight forward. Decisions on Squadron manning,
however, were another matter altogether. At all times, both the
balance of crew commanders by rank and experience, and the
mixture of gunner/sigs and drivers, had to be exactly right. Any
failure in this, and operational capability would suffer.
In addition, for those returning home unexpectedly early, posting preferences had to be discussed, postings arranged, family removals organised and so on. In almost all cases where R&R had not yet been taken, arrangements had to be completely rescheduled. Sergeant Garry Brown and his orderly room clerks were the ones caught in the middle; doing their best to help achieve preferences for those affected by the sudden changes, but not always able to do so. |
| Operations Continue Unabated |
April 1971
would be the last month that a complete tank squadron would
operate in support of 1ATF; two years and eight months after C
Squadron were fully fielded in September 1968. Following the
contact with D445 near the Song Rai earlier in the month, all
tank troops continued to be fully committed on operations: 1
Troop (Cornell) landclearing protection (NDP Rebecca); 2 Troop (Farrant),
constructing crossings over the Song Rai; 3 Troop (Hind),
supporting 2RAR/NZ (Fire Support Base Lindy); 4 Troop (Goldman),
Task Force Ready Reaction and ambushing in the vicinity of Hoa
Long ; and 5 Troop (Cameron), supporting 3RAR (Fire Support Base
Marj).
|
| The Invisible Enemy | Having cleared the road to a point 8km north of Fire Support Base Beth earlier in the morning, the tank was returning; when, at around 1140hrs, it detonated a 60--80lb (27--36kg) mine. The explosion occurred beneath the front of the vehicle, making it likely that the mine was deliberately set up to circumvent the M48A3's roller attachment. There were a number of ways of doing this: offsetting the explosive charge from the switch, using a pressure switch which would only operate under the weight of the tank itself, and rigging the mine to detonate on command. Surprisingly, although the suspension and running gear were badly damaged, the crew escaped relatively unharmed. After recovery back to Nui Dat the following day, 92Tango was returned to the US Army for repair. 1ATF were provided with another mineclearer, callsign 48Whisky, as a temporary replacement. |
| Anzac Day and VIPs |
VIPs
also visited Fire Support Base Marj during April. They included
two of the three officers who were responsible, almost four
years before, for recommending that Centurion tanks be sent to
Vietnam: General Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO, and Major
General 'Tim' Vincent, CB, OBE. The former, having retired in
1970, was a member of the Kerr Committee enquiring into
conditions of service in the Australian Defence Force. Vincent,
on the other hand, was the Army's Adjutant General at the time.
One can only wonder at what their thoughts might have been
regarding the decision to leave 1ATF without tank support during
the withdrawal.
Paradoxically, the third of the
original decision makers, Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly,
KBE, CB, DSO, visited Fire Support Base Beth just days later.
This was his final visit to Vietnam before retiring as Chief of
the General Staff. In convincing the Minister for Defence to
approve the tank deployment in 1967, Daly's military judgement
had been vindicated. The question now had to asked: was the
timing of the withdrawal of C Squadron, a military or political
decision?
|
| Repair Support Becomes Even More Critical |
With 4 Troop
entering the washing program on 1 May, the operational
availability of every tank was now even more critical than it
had been before. In 1969, the average main engine life for B
Squadron tanks was about 1100km; suddenly, in 1971, engines were
failing after less than 250km. When C Squadron first took the
field in 1968, an abnormally high failure rate of Centurion
idler wheels threatened to cause a loss of operational
capability...a similar crisis now existed in relation to main
engines.
|
| The Enemy Remains Elusive |
Having
spent the night of 24/25 April at Fire Support Base Beth, 2
Troop redeployed in support of A Company 3RAR...moving to a
position of reaction, around 10km north of Xuyen Moc. To the
extent that it had to be travelled on, Route 329 was clear of
mines. There was something different to be found on it the
following day, however.
At about 1130hrs, 26 April 1971,
Captain Rowan Monteith (161 Recce Flight) was conducting low
level reconnaissance when the pilot of his 'top cover' aircraft,
radioed that there was smoke coming from the Sioux's engine. The
only cleared area in the jungle below was Route 329. Monteith
made an emergency landing, extinguished the fire, and concealed
himself in the jungle. 2 Troop, about 5kms to the south, reacted
immediately to secure the area. The FAC pilot also did what he
could, bringing: 'a pair of Phantoms down on top of [Monteith],
doing low passes at nothing feet'.
|
| How Quickly Can 4RAR/NZ become Effective? |
Although
4RAR/NZ assumed operational responsibility from 2RAR/NZ
immediately they arrived in-country, it would still be some
weeks before they were fully acclimatised and familiar with the
conditions. 1ATF would have a much reduced capability in the
interim. This situation was compounded by the fact that: the new
ANZAC Battalion had four, rather than five, rifle companies; one
tank troop had already been withdrawn and another was about to
go; and the FSVs were not yet available. (A manoeuvre element
that the Task Force Commander called on as a 'compensator' at
this time, was the Detachment, 1 Forward Delivery Troop. During
the 4RAR/NZ tank training, they were deployed in
ambushes/positions of reaction to the east of Nui Dat.)
|
| How Quickly Can the FSVs be Made Available? |
At the time,
Army had neither FSVs nor trained crews. A co-ordinating
conference was held in Canberra on 22 April 1971. The first four
vehicles were scheduled to come off the production line at the
Ordnance Factory Bendigo during 29 April--7 May 1971. The
departure date for HMAS Jeparit's next voyage to Vietnam was 15
May (ETA 30 May). Timing for completion of the second production
batch of four vehicles (two additional vehicles were to be held
in Vietnam as a repair pool) meant that crew training would have
to be conducted 'in-country'. At least the task of identifying
potential crewmen was relatively straight forward.
|
| The Enemy Returns in Strength |
Possibly in response to this, the Commander of the Royal Thai
Army forces to the north of Phuoc Tuy, proposed that a joint
1ATF/Thai operation be conducted. With 4RAR/NZ not yet fully
settled in, it was only the tank squadron who could be
redeployed to provide a manoeuvre element to support the Thais.
Major Bourke was involved in a number of joint planning
conferences. Arrangements had reached the point where orders
were about to be issued, when:
"...all of a sudden. 33NVA Regiment decided that it was going to move into Phuoc Tuy [to the] east of Route 2 and north of [Route] 327. So the Thai op was called off. Tank troops were put into ready reaction roles and also into the defence of fire support bases." |
Chapter 28: Operation OVERLORD (11500 words)
| Topic : The Squadron Aid Post |
Taking paludrine was not left to chance...everyone's name was ticked off in a roll book as they were handed their tablet (usually, in the case of tank troops, by the troop sergeant) Prior to RTA, everyone commenced a fourteen day malarial eradication course. This involved different drugs yet again. Being a sign of imminent departure, the tablets were known as 'happy pills'. As it was for all Corps, the effectiveness of RAAMC preparation in Australia, depended on the experience gained in the field being quickly fed back into the training system. At least one medic felt that casualty simulation did little to prepare him for the real thing: 'From a medical perspective, I don't think anything can train you for your first major casualties, particularly the horror of the scene'. |
| The Deployment into Long Khanh Province. | There were some within the Task Force who were worried that the Operation's timing might be compromised by giving it the same name as that which had been used for the Second World War D Day landings, an association made even more obvious by naming the AOs after the Normandy beachheads, eg. AO Gold (3RAR); AO Juno (4RAR/NZ); and AO OMAHA (2/8 Battalion). Within three weeks, those who dismissed this idea as fanciful, would be forced to reconsider. Documents captured in an enemy position only 10km away, included 'part of a book containing [the] story of [the] Normandy Invasion'. Undoubtedly the account would have described how the D Day landings were intended to be launched on 5 June 1944, but had to be delayed a day because of bad weather. The fact that 1ATF's OVERLORD Operation was scheduled to commence on 5 June may not have been a complete surprise to the the enemy. |
| An Enemy Position is Found, but Late in the Day. |
In the short time available before last light, 5 Troop tried to find a route which might lead towards 5 Platoon, should it be needed the next day. There was no quick way through, however; the jungle was just too thick. Along with 2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav, both tank troops (3 Troop were to the east of 5 Troop, supporting C Company) were ordered to ambush any enemy withdrawing in their direction during the night. 5 Troop took up a position about 900m north west of 5 Platoon's contact. 3RAR's plan was for artillery to be brought down on the enemy position for 30mins, starting at 0600hrs the next morning. 5 Platoon would then move forward and investigate. Based on previous experience, it was expected that the position would be found to have been abandoned by the enemy during the night. 5 Troop and the APCs were ordered to pull back from their night locations to meet safety requirements, prior to the artillery barrage commencing. |
|
The Battle is Joined. |
Less than fifty metres later, there was a flash and small white 'puff' just above ground level to the right of 5Charlie. For a split second, the 'puff' reminded Cameron of what sometimes happens when a tank crushes a rock. Then came the 'Bang!', and with it, the realisation that the jungle had changed---there were small patches of cleared vegetation, tracks, and cut saplings. Callsign 5Alpha (Sergeant Jim de Turt) knew what had happened: '5Charlie was engaged by one round of RPG fire, the range being very close, as the primary and secondary explosions sounded as one'. The immediate action drill was ordered. |
| Shock Action and Fire Superiority |
Arriving about 0755hrs, 3 Troop were directed to conduct a sweep towards a tree line south east of SHQ's position, firing 'canister to suppress any likely enemy locations'. Having seen off any enemy in the vicinity, they were then sent to support 5 Troop, about 1200m to the south. Callsign 5Bravo was ordered to join them, while the ARV was held back. Prior to guiding 3 Troop from the air, Scott told Bourke to resume command of both tank troops and warned the 3RAR reserve (D Company) to be ready to be picked up by APCs. The previous 25 minutes had been hectic for 5 Troop. Without being able to use his main arament, 5Charlie was vulnerable. Callsigns 5 and 5Alpha endeavoured to establish fire superiority at the point of battle. The crew of 5Charlie kept fighting their tank: "It took some time to extract the round and load another. While this was going on, my gunner saw one VC....looking out of the bunker. We engaged him with .30 [cal] coax and .50 cal , but he quickly disappeared. The rest of the Troop were being fired at with RPGs and small arms and they had moved up on my right. Finally, my main armament was cleared and we destroyed the bunker". |
| Tanks Employed En Masse. |
Corporal Clarke (3Bravo) saw the RPG which was fired at 3 Troop: 'I told [callsigns] 3 and 3Charlie where it came from and in an instant we were firing in that direction and turning our vehicles to face the direction of the enemy'. Trooper Rus Bird, callsign 3's operator, was wounded when he was hit in the neck by shrapnel from the RPG. He was able to remain on duty. Effective communication between tanks is always vital, but particularly so when eight AFVs from two troops are fighting a resolute enemy in close country with limited visibility. All crews must have complete confidence in each other and co-operate fully. When this becomes second nature, one knows that all the effort put in during training has been worthwhile. Lance Corporal McDonald (3Charlie) provided a good example: Things had just begun to quieten down when something exploded to my left. 5Alpha immediately told 3Bravo that it had come from the right --- 3Bravo and 5Bravo 'jockeyed' and began firing to our right flank. |
| Consolidation on the Position. |
Three helicopters had hovered above B Company's position at different times that morning. When another ammunition drop was attempted just after 1100hrs, the enemy responded with intense ground fire...succeeding in shooting down the Iroquois. The pilot and door gunner were killed; the co-pilot, RAAF crewman and 3RAR 'padmaster' were wounded. (3RAR Corporals Trevor Byng and Ray Walsh displayed immense bravery in helping to rescue casualties from the wreckage.) The infantry/tank advance towards B Company had been about to commence, but was now placed on hold by Lieutenant Colonel Scott. While there was a lull in proceedings, D Company searched some of the defences which the armour had overrun. One bunker produced a find of great interest to the tank crews: a photocopied page from a Boys Own Journal (or the like), showing a cross section of a Centurion tank. Arrows with labels in Vietnamese highlighted the different crew positions and the ammunition stowed above the hull floor. |
| The Closing Stages. |
Soon after moving forward, Sergeant de Turt in 5Alpha had a deadly battle of a different sort on his hands. A large wasps' nest, knocked down from a tree, fell on top of him. Like the 'killer' bees encountered by Rosemond's tank the year before, the wasps became frenzied and extremely aggressive. De Turt was stung repeatedly about the face and neck and was 'dusted off' soon after. Once the sweep got underway again, the full enormity of the enemy position started to be come clear. Not only were there 46 bunkers, but also: fighting pits; extensive living areas and track systems; an assault course; a lecture area; training facilities; wells; and latrines. The lecture area had a lectern and seating for 30 people and was only one to two weeks old. The Combat Engineer Team found numerous dummy M16 mines and practice hand grenades in the training area, while the assault course included simulated barbed wire obstacles. In places, the smell indicated that fire support earlier in the day had taken its toll on the defenders. |
|
Return to Nui Dat. |
Bourke had been proven correct in terms of the benefits to be gained by deploying SHQ when more than one tank troop is involved in an operation. The value of a tank LO being attached to 3RAR was also acknowledged in the post Operation debrief. Interestingly, Major Terry Walker's pleas prior to the Operation for A Squadron 3 Cav 'to be given its own AO with [APC] troops operating directly under SHQ', were not met. He strongly believed that it would be a much more economical use of 'cavalry' resources. |
| Topic: 1 Australian Field Hospital | 1ATF's withdrawal affected medical units in the same way as all others---numbers of personnel had to be progressively scaled down. Maintaining a full range of medical and surgical capabilities was complicated because US force reductions meant that, in some cases, access to specialists was no longer possible. There was concern in the Task Force that once the tanks were withdrawn, 1ATF would not have sufficient direct fire support for operational needs. Should this result in a greater number of casualties than allowed for, the set back would be even worse if insufficient medical support was available to treat them. |
| Separate Battalion Operations Again |
It was evening by the time the crossing was made passable and the tanks were able to get through. Given the time, they were left with no alternative, other than to find the best defensive position they could, for the night. At 2145hrs, the Troop Leader reported his location and requested clearance to fire out to a radius of 1000m radius, if attacked. There were more challenges next morning, with essential repairs taking another two hours. Thank goodness for the Bluebells! Once they got going again, 1 Troop's immediate priority was to provide protection for the establishment of a mortar fire support base. The CO 3RAR (Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scott) explained later that: 'with the loss of the New Zealand 161 Field Battery in early May, greater reliance was placed on the battalion mortars'. 1 Troop remained with the mortars for the coming week, while C Company cleared to the east. |
| Operation HERMIT PARK |
Bourke immediately sought the release of 3 Troop (Sergeant Phil Reeves) from Fire Support Base Mary and ordered the Troop to move to an assembly area about 2km to the east of the bunker system. It was now 1217hrs. 5 Troop (including ZeroEcho which had become 5Charlie) were ordered to pick up 1 Platoon and take them to the Forming Up Place (FUP) on the back of their tanks. By 1410hrs, the C Squadron Group had assembled. 2 Platoon Victor Company had broken contact, 'dusted off' their wounded, and withdrawn to the west. Artillery and air support continued to target the enemy position. Bourke gave his orders at 1435hrs and 10mins later, the attack commenced. SHQ and Admin Troop elements maintained at base at the FUP. |
| Closing with the Enemy. |
The tanks continued to push forward through the jungle for over an hour. At 1545hrs, a small clearing revealed an abandoned cooking area...not long after, recent digging indicated a grave or a cache. As the axis of assault neared the reported enemy position, it was adjusted slightly to fit in with the bend in the river. Just at this moment, callsign 5 experienced another surprise: ...part of a tree (previously hit by artillery) fell and almost knocked my driver [Trooper Jones] unconscious; he was pretty well concussed, we got him out and another driver came forward. (I'd changed vehicles; I'd had to do so about six times over the four days and I had 5Bravo..the replacement driver was the new one from my previous tank, Trooper Cadge.) Jones was evacuated back to the FUP by APC. Callsign 5Alpha went too, to help secure the 'dust off' LZ. The assault recommenced at 1610hrs with five tanks. |
| The Objective is Reached |
The other tanks immediately suppressed the ground to their front with canister. Lingering puffs of smoke revealed a fire lane...which now served its purpose, in reverse. Reeves manoeuvred his tank to the left of Anderson's and engaged the surrounding area. 1 Platoon quickly moved forward to help secure the left flank. Being an 'ex-tankie', the Platoon Commander (Fry) instinctively jumped up onto the back of 3Bravo. He was quickly joined by Lance Corporal John Adams and Private Bill Papuni who helped get Anderson and Barwick out of the turret and onto the back of the tank. The crewmen were then lowered to the ground, stabilised by the Platoon medics, and transferred to callsign 12Bravo (Lance Corporal Peter Turner had brought his APC forward to collect them). Bourke arranged for the casualties be evacuated to the rear and 'dusted off' as quickly as possible. Anderson's tank was recovered back to the SHQ area. The assault recommenced at 1650hrs with four tanks. |
|
Consolidation |
Once Cadge had been evacuated (Hanuszewicz was able to remain on duty), Bourke's next priority was ammunition resupply...he had to be prepared, in case of either an opportunity to exploit the gains achieved, or an enemy counter attack. During the contact, the tanks fired sixty canister, four HE and two APCBC rounds. Forty four 'liners' (250 rounds) of .30cal and eight 'liners' (100 rounds) of .50cal were also expended. The Squadron's battle procedure was such that ammunition was assembled by the SSM (Warrant Officer Brian Agnew) and Admin Troop personnel and delivered (usually by Chinook helicopter) as the contact progressed. This had been done and the ammunition was already being brought forward by APCs (dispatched earlier by Earle to collect it from the LZ). By 1858hrs, the tanks had completed 'bombing up'. It was something that Bourke never wanted to have to do again: 'We ended, up on dark, taking ammo [aboard the tanks] right on the edge of the bunker system'. |
| The Second Assault |
One of the things found in the bunker system, was a five gallon drum of oil, an item which highlighted the military capability of the enemy. Weapons must be cleaned and oiled regularly, if they are to operate effectively. This is especially so in humid tropical conditions. The importance placed on weapon servicing justified the considerable effort involved in ensuring that oil was available (as was the case in the Australian Army). A professional enemy, indeed! At 1521hrs, the tank crews were ordered to destroy the bunkers. |
Chapter 30 : The Last Action Involving Tanks (8200 words)
| Topic: 'Staff Support' | As the 'days to go' started to get less and less, ARA members' thoughts turned to where they would be posted to next. For those who were married, this affected things like: children's schooling; the removal of personal effects; married quarter availability; and temporary accommodation arrangements. Posting orders also stipulated 'march-in' dates...these, in turn, dictated leave options. Married or single, leave was a subject which loomed large in everyone's mind. |
| DETACHMENT 1 FORWARD DELIVERY TROOP DEPARTS |
According to the withdrawal plan, apart from 1 and 5 Troops, another resource was available until mid July: the Detachment 1 Forward Delivery Troop. They had not been forgotten, however. On 28 June, Captain Chad Sutton was ordered to provide protection for Fire Support Base Maureen. Once the task was completed, the ad hoc Troop returned to Nui Dat on 6 July 1971...to start the process of transferring stores to C Squadron, in preparation for Forward Delivery's RTA. This brought to an end the civil aid in Duc Thanh District that the Detachment had undertaken for many years. The Montagnard hamlets were often the focus of this work. With a little ingenuity and enthusiasm, timber from artillery ammunition boxes and left over tin sheet were able to be recycled to help improve living conditions for the 'worse off' familiies. Other tasks involved windmill repair, laying concrete, constructing a brick dispensary, and painting buildings. |
| WOULD THE ENEMY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE 'WET'? |
It was now approaching the middle of the Wet season. As the Task Force Commander saw the force available to him dwindling, he must have wondered if the enemy would try to capitalise on the movement and surveillance restrictions being forced on 1ATF by the weather. The tempo of operations was kept up as much as was possible. Along with everyone else, engineers were heavily committed: combat engineer teams searched and destroyed enemy installations found by the infantry; a mine clearing team commenced work in the vicinity of the Dinh Co Monastry; repair work on Route 327 was undertaken; and land clearing in the Tan Ru continued. As had been the case for some time, there were insufficient tank troops to allow them to be allocated to these operations. The extra responsibility was borne largely by A Squadron 3 Cav. The FSV Troop played their part, helping to protect the land clearing team. At this stage of Operation HONEY II, the FSVs were based successively at NDPs Dianne, Carol, and Judith. The 'Wet' was making a difficult job, even more so. Landclearing had to be suspended on some days because the dozer operators were unable to see through the rain. The FSV crews were forced to adapt their vehicles to meet the demanding conditions. |
| QUICK REACTION |
With so little armour support, pre-positioning was everything. On 21 July, when an enemy soldier who had been killed in a 4RAR/NZ contact, was identified as belonging to 274 Regiment...5 Troop were reacted immediately: '...doing a mad dash through the J, with Warren [Second Lieutenant Hind] guiding us from the air'. B Company (Major Bob Hogarth) were in thick jungle in Long Khanh Province, about 9km north west of Courtenay Hill. Unfortunately, fading light prevented marrying up and the tanks had to occupy a harbour some 2km 'short' of the infantry. SHQ and 1 Troop were called forward to a 'holding position' in the same area at first light next morning. Good anticipation on the part of Lieutenant Colonel Hughes meant that 5 Troop were on hand when B Company contacted enemy in a bunker system later that morning. This was not to be a repeat of the battle with 1 Battalion 274 Regiment a month earlier. Despite preparations to defend the position, such as a 105mm projectile rigged for detonation with a Claymore firing device, the enemy beat a hasty retreat...abandoning 13 bunkers. Although the tanks exploited beyond the system, the enemy made good their escape. |
| OPERATION IRON FOX : ADVANCE TO CONTACT | The Start Line was crossed at 1400hrs on 28 July 1971. C Squadron were placed on 15mins notice to move. The only find of significance that day was on the southern bank of the Suoi Ca: B Company came across newly cut tree stumps. With the tanks on the opposite side, this would not have been the news the Task Force Commander was hoping to receive. Nevertheless, he resolved to back his intelligence reports and maintain the existing dispositions. His judgement proved correct. |
| OPERATION IRON FOX : TANK FIRE SUPPORT PROVES INVALUABLE (AGAIN) | As soon as 1 Troop married up with D Company, they endeavoured to move forward to close with the enemy: 'Their progress was necessarily slow, because of the thickness of the vegetation, the size of the trees and the difficulty in identifying own troops'. As always in situations like this, the infantry were not only being shot at from the front, but also conscious of being injured by a tank approaching from behind: '...we were also desperately looking over our shoulders for trees and branches being knocked down by the tanks as they crashed forward'. As on other occasions, this was the point at which the true meaning of infantry/tank co-operation became apparent. There was no drill to be followed, it was a matter of everyone, at all levels, making it work. An entry in the C Squadron radio log at 1532hrs, foretold that the action was about to intensify: '1 Troop engaged by RPGs; 5 Troop rejoined Squadron' |
|
A TANK DETONATES A MINE FOR THE LAST TIME |
Although its crew were not physically wounded, Callsign 1 itself was not so lucky. The centre left suspension station was badly damaged, the roadwheels from it being blown off. (They were unable to be found within 300m of the tank.) SHQ and 5 Troop joined up with 1 Troop and a harbour was formed while arrangements were made to get the tank mobile. Theoretically, if the track was able to reconnected, the tank would be able to be driven. Although replacement track links were flown in to do this, a damaged final drive meant that callsign 1 would have to be towed. Repairs would probably have been completed in the field if 1 Troop were to remain on operations. According to Operation TIMOTHY, however, the Troop were supposed to have been withdrawn on 1 August. |
Chapter 31: Withdrawal: A Premature Departure? (3700 words)
| Topic: The Decision to Withdraw Tanks Early |
In January 1971, the then Task Force Commander, Brigadier Bill Henderson, had argued that the operational importance of the tanks far outweighed any logistic advantage to be gained by withdrawing them early[. He was overruled. When Brigadier McDonald and Major General Dunstan took over as Commander 1ATF and COMAFV (February and March 1971 respectively) the decision had already been made...they had to make the best of it. |
| Was the Enemy Preparing for a New Offensive? |
The lead up to the elections passed without a major attack on the population centres of Phuoc Tuy. This might have been due to the constant patrolling program undertaken by 1ATF. Another possibility, of course, was that the enemy were biding their time. All Task Force troops were on high alert throughout the election day (29 August 1971); non-tactical movement around Phuoc Tuy was forbidden.
The threat failed to materialise, however, and the Ready Reaction Force were not called out. In keeping with the timetable, therefore, 5 Troop were withdrawn from operations. 1ATF were now without tank support. With their maintenance support no longer required, 106 Field Workshop stood down from operations at midnight on 31 August 1971. |
| From Tactics to Logistics : The Challenge of Getting the Tanks Home |
Because of greed and political ideology, maritime unions had previously disrupted logistic support for Australian military operations in Vietnam. Paradoxically, the Australian Waterside Workers' Union now instituted bans designed to disrupt the withdrawal of Australian troops. One of the activities blacklisted was the unloading of ships returning from Vietnam. As HMAS Jeparit was not equipped with cranes which the crew could use to unload the ship, another cargo vessel had to be found to return the tanks. The MV Harima Maru had an integral heavy lift capability and had just 'delivered Australian Defence Aid to Cambodia'. It could be 'back chartered' if its cranes could lift a Centurion. With a load capacity of 110 000lbs [50 000kg], it was decided that that it would suffice and the charter agreement was signed. The ship was large enough to carry all 28 Centurions in one trip and a date was set for loading them at Vung Tau---12 September 1971. Suddenly, someone, somewhere, realised that there could be a problem with the planning weight of the Centurion which had been used when chartering the Harima Maru. Had staff tables been updated to take account of the changes in Centurion build standars which had been incorporated for Vietnam? |
|
Last Days
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A major deadline loomed four days after the Harima Maru departed. On 16 September, all remaining C Squadron personnel had to vacate their lines and move to the former site of 106 Field Worshop. ARVN troops were to occupy the tank squadron sector of Nui Dat's perimeter defences. Even before dawn, scores of Vietnamese could be seen gathering in the surrounding vicinity. When the time came, it was so much a handover, as a 'takeover'. Some who had worked hard to first establish and then progressively develop, the squadron area...may have been dismayed.
Then again, on reflection, they may consider the legacy of their time and endeavour to be something which is measured in a very different way. Warrant Officer Ivan Maher recalled a feeling of pride when the Centurions lumbered into Fire Support Base Coral on 23 May 1968. Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, CO 4RAR/NZ referred to something similar when he wrote to Major Bourke on 31 August 1971...
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Postscript:
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Failing light meant that D Company had to pull back from the bunkers and adopt a secure night defensive position. Three Australian bodies had to be left where they fell. The enemy withdrew during the night. They had been defeated by the bravery of infantrymen in circumstances in which they were all there was. If the enemy had plans to disrupt 1ATF's withdrawal and achieve a propaganda victory, they came to nothing. 4RAR/NZ suffered five KIA and 22 WIA.
On 17 February 1967, when 6RAR attacked an occupied bunker system during Operation BRIBIE, the infantry casualties were eight KIA and 27 WIA (one of those left for dead on the battlefield, was found alive next morning). It was decided then to send tanks to support 1ATF. |
Epilogue
ANNEXES (These Annexes have been compiled by Mr Mike Cecil, Head Curator, Military Heraldry and Technology, at the Australian War Memorial.)
Annex D : Tank Casualties (mines, RPGs, etc).